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ABSTRACT
Independent Counsel: 
Process and Policy
by
Sheri Michele Schwartz
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Independent Counsel: Process and Policy examines the Office o f the Independent 
Counsel, established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. It discusses the history o f 
the Act, its implementation, and its application. Although there is a need for independent 
investigation of high-level government officials, the Act suffers from major defects 
which damage its credibility in accomplishing the goals Congress set with its passage. 
Independent Counsel: Process and Policy suggests changes to the Act which will 
increase the efficiency and fairness o f the office, and encourage efforts to eradicate the 
public’s perception of the independent coimsel as a renegade.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“The Independent Counsel is wholly free of presidential control and 
virtually impervious to dismissal; he is accountable only to his own
conscience.
“Starr: Relentless or Reluctant?"^
“The Escalating War Between the President and Independent Counsel"^
“The Last Starr Fighter?"^
The headlines become more outrageous as the days pass. Within a matter 
of months. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has become the subject of a  storm of 
publicity and controversy over his tactics in investigating the relationship between the 
President o f the United States and a White House intern. Although subject to criticism 
over the Whitewater investigation, which has been ongoing since 1994, Starr’s actions 
have never been as prominent. Concurrently, the country’s attention has focused on the 
statute which gives Starr so much power, the Independent Counsel Act, a provision of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Almost daily, commentators opine on the efficacy 
and constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act, and engage in heated debate over 
whether it should be modified or repealed.
Erik Luna, Imbalance o f  Power, Los Angeles Daily Journal, February 26, 1998,6.
Ruth Marcus, Relentless or Reluctant, Washington Post, January 30,1998, A l.
Senator Arlen Spector, The Escalating War Between the President and 
Independent Counsel, Congressional Record, March 2, 1998, si 195-sl 197.
Amy Keller, The Last Starr Fighter?, Roll Call, March 2,1998, 2.
I
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This thesis examines the statute, its history, scope, constitutionality and 
policy implications, as well as the attacks leveled against the law and its appointees. The 
Office o f the Independent Counsel has significant power, but not unlimited power. It 
serves a purpose which no other government office can serve: to independently 
investigate alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials without a conflict 
of interest. While many argue otherwise, this thesis takes the position that the 
Independent Counsel is a necessary check on the power of the Executive Branch and 
should be maintained.
History
The law commonly referred to as the Independent Counsel Act was 
enacted as part o f the Ethics in Government Act o f 1978 (“The Act”). It was the first 
statute providing for a court-appointed Independent Counsel. However, it is not the first 
time independent investigators have been appointed in response to allegations o f 
malfeasance. It is also not the only way to investigate malfeasance in government office. 
There are many examples of the President and/or Congress taking it upon himself or itself 
to investigate allegations of wrong-doing.
In the two hundred years before the enactment of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978, the Executive Branch was responsible for responding to 
charges of its own malfeasance. One writer terms this the “politics o f ethics.”  ̂ In 
fashioning the unitary executive, it is argued, the Founders believed a single executive 
would be more accountable to the people for both his conduct and his administration’s 
conduct. Further, the President is obligated under Article II, Section 3 o f the Constitution 
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Thus, the President, by design and
 ̂ T er^  Eastland, Ethics, Politics and the Independent Counsel, (Washington, D C.: 
National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1989), 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
constitutional mandate, is obligated to investigate charges or appoint others to investigate 
charges against his administration.*
The President himself has been directly involved in investigating such 
allegations on at least two occasions. President Washington confronted his Secretary of 
State Edmund Randolph with evidence that he might have engaged in treasonous activity 
with the French, after which Randolph resigned. ’ President Cleveland instructed his 
Secretary of the Interior to investigate his Attomey General for alleged conflicts of 
interest when the Attomey General’s office filed a lawsuit, the result of which could have 
increased the Attomey General’s financial portfolio by millions. The investigation 
cleared the Attomey General o f any wrongdoing because he never actually authorized the 
lawsuit.*
After the Justice Department was established in 1870. investigations were 
usually conducted by its attomeys.’ For example, during the Garfield presidency in the 
late 1800’s, the Justice Department investigated the “Star Route Frauds”, which involved 
fraudulent contracts for mail delivery in rural areas. The investigation implicated 
Stephen W. Dorsey, Secretary of the Republican National Committee and Garfield’s 
1880 campaign manager.'” During the Kennedy Administration, the Justice Department 
investigated conflict o f interest charges against Secretary o f the Navy Fred Korth. During 
the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department investigated allegations of conspiracy, 
extortion and bribery involving Vice-President Spiro Agnew. " Spiro Agnew resigned 
and pled no contest to one count o f tax evasion in October, 1973. He was fined $10,000
10
Eastland, 2.
Eastland, 7.
Eastland, 7-8.
Although the office of the Attomey General was created in 1789, the Justice 
Department was not created until 1870. Eastland, 8, n.2.
Eastland, 8.
Eastland, 8.
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and sentenced to three years o f unsupervised probation. The Attomey General 
recommended no prison time as part of an agreement that Agnew would resign.'^
Congress has also responded to and investigated Executive Branch 
misconduct. For example. Congress investigated a corruption charge made against 
Alexander Hamilton. It investigated President Monroe twice for allegedly putting public 
funds to private use. It investigated President Monroe’s Secretary o f the Treasury for 
illegally managing public funds. Congress also investigated several officials in the 
Jackson Administration for allegedly misusing public money, and President Buchanan 
and his administration for bribery and corruption. More recently, it has Investigated 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, President Hoover’s Postmaster General, 
President Truman’s top military aide in the White House, and President Eisenhower’s 
chief aide.'^ Congress has just completed an investigation o f the Intemal Revenue 
Service and is currently investigating campaign finance irregularities in the Democratic 
Party.
As for Special Prosecutors, at least six have been appointed prior to the 
enactment o f the Independent Counsel Act. The first one was appointed during President 
Ulysses S. Grant’s term in 1875. President Grant’s personal secretary was investigated 
for accepting bribes from moonshiners cheating revenue laws.'"* Grant subsequently fired 
the Special Prosecutor for being too aggressive in his investigation.”  The second and 
third Special Prosecutors were appointed during Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration.
In 1902, Francis Heney was appointed to prosecute a land fraud ring implicating the 
former Commission o f the General Land Office. In 1903, Charles Bonaparte was
12
13
14
United States v Agnew, 428 F Supp 1293, 1294 (DMd 1974).
Eastland, 9-11.
Robert G. Solloway, TTte Institutionalized Wolf: An Analysis o f  the 
Unconstitutionality o f  the Independent Counsel Provisions o f  the Ethics in 
Government Act o f 1978, 21 Indiana Law Review 955, 956 (1988).
Eastland, 14.
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appointed to investigate charges o f corruption in the Post Office that implicated an 
Assistant Attomey General.'* Two Special Prosecutors were appointed by President 
Coolidge and confirmed by the Senate to investigate the Teapot Dome Scandal. One was 
a Republican and one a  Democrat.'^ During the Truman Administration, the Attomey 
General appointed a “Special Assistant” to investigate corruption in the Justice 
Department. When the Special Assistant asked for the Attomey General’s files, he was 
fired. The Attomey General was subsequently fired.'*
Prior to the Independent Counsel Act, both the President and Congress had 
occasion to investigate members o f the Executive Branch, with a variety of results. Some 
officials were cleared, others were fired, tried and convicted, others resigned. Despite the 
results, investigations were conducted and the public was informed. The public could 
then choose whether to hold the President accountable for the alleged wrong-doing.
When the President did not aggressively pursue investigation. Congress often stepped in 
and did so, informing the public o f the President’s failure to take action. Again, the 
public had its choice. This process significantly changed with the enactment of the 
Independent Counsel Act.
Title VI of The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 592-599, ("The 
Act”) was first passed in 1978. The purpose of The Act was to establish a neutral 
procedure for resolving the conflict o f interest that arises when the Attomey General must 
decide whether to pursue allegations of wrongdoing leveled against high-ranking federal 
officers, which will typically be the Attomey General’s close political associates.'”
'* Eastland, 8.
Eastland, 8. This was the first and only time a special prosecutor has been 
confirmed by the Senate.
'* Solloway, 956.
'” Banzhafv Smith, 737 F2d 1167,1168 (DC Cir 1984).
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The impetus o f The Act was President’s Nixon’s handling o f the Special 
Prosecutor investigating the Watergate scandal, Archibald Cox '” When the Watergate 
scandal broke. President Nixon asked his Attomey General designee, Eliot Richardson, to 
appoint a Special Prosecutor if  he deemed it necessary in order to conduct an impartial 
investigation. On May 25, 1973, Richardson appointed Archibald Cox. But when Mr. 
Cox insisted that the President tum over notes, tapes, and memos of conversations, the 
President ordered the Attomey General to remove Mr. Cox. The Attomey General 
refused and subsequently resigned. The Deputy Attomey General was also ordered to 
remove Mr. Cox and refused. He was dismissed from office, after attempting to resign. 
Finally, Acting Attomey General Robert Bork relieved Cox of his duties. At the same 
time, Cox’s offices were sequestered by federal agents. The incident was termed the 
“Saturday Night Massacre.”*'
As one article comments;
In Title VI o f the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress 
institutionalized the historic political decision made after President Nixon 
ordered the dismissal of Archibald Cox and sequestered his downtown 
Washington offices. In the shock of that moment, the American public got 
a taste o f what it would be like to live in a country where their ruler is 
above the law. They reacted with rare swiftness, clarity, and force. The 
political message was unambiguous—the Watergate investigation was to 
proceed, and to proceed outside the control o f the President and the 
Attorney General. Simultaneously, the people sent another instruction to 
their representatives: find a practical, orderly way—short of impeachment 
or a Watergate-style political convulsion—to assure that future Presidents 
could not place themselves or their close aides above the law.’*
20
21
22
The Nixon administration precipitated several Congressional efforts to reign in 
executive power: the War Powers Resolution o f 1973, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, and the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act o f 1974. Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel 
Mess, 102 Harvard Law Review 105,107-108 (1988).
Constance O ’Keefe and Peter Safirstein, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and 
the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination o f  the Practical, Constitutional, 
and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions o f  the Ethics in 
Government Act, 49 Brooklyn Law Review 113, 114-119 (1982).
Simon Lazarus and Jane E. Larson, The Constitutionality o f  the Independent 
Counsel Statute, 25 American Criminal Law Review 187 (1987).
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Subsequently, the Office of the Independent Counsel was first proposed in 
the Senate in 1974. Committees in the House and Senate conducted hearings in 1975, 
which continued and culminated in The Act’s enactment in 1978.*  ̂ During the 
Congressional hearings, the proposed legislation seemed to gamer widespread support in 
the legal community, including the American Bar Association, legal scholars, and public 
interest groups.’" Congress provided that The Act would expire in five years. It has been 
reauthorized three times since, in 1983,1987, and 1994.
Since 1978, at least 18 Independent Counsels have been appointed to 
investigate allegations o f drug use, perjury, bribery, conflicts o f interest, financial 
improprieties, lying, and abuse of executive power, at a total cost o f about $115 million.”  
O f the investigations, the one which has consumed the most resources is Lawrence 
Walsh’s investigation o f the Iran-Contra affair, at a total cost o f about $47.4 million.”  Of 
those prosecuted by Walsh, four were convicted (two of those overturned), seven pled 
guilty, and six were given presidential pardons.”  After Walsh’s investigation, Arlin 
Adams’ investigation of Samuel Pierce and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development cost about $27.1 million and resulted in seven guilty pleas, eleven 
convictions, and one acquittal.”  Kenneth Starr’s investigation o f Clinton and the 
Whitewater matter is growing and will surpass Adams’ investigation, at a total cost of 
$25.6 million as of June, 1997, resulting thus far in at least six guilty pleas and three 
convictions.”
23
24
25
26
27
28 
29
North V Walsh, 656 F Supp 414,416 (DDC 1987).
Ibid.
Honorable Harvie Wilkinson III and Honorable T.S. Ellis 111, The Independent 
Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed? 54 Washington & 
Lee Law Review 1515,1523 (1997).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Scope
Under The Act, the Independent Counsel investigates and prosecutes 
certain high-ranking government officials, if prosecution is warranted. High-ranking 
officials include the President and Vice-President, cabinet officials, high-level 
presidential aides, the Attomey General, high-level assistant attorneys general, the 
director and deputy director o f the CIA, presidential campaign officials, and the 
commissioner of Intemal Revenue.”  Other persons, including members o f Congress, 
may also be investigated under certain conditions.
The investigation begins when the Attomey General receives information 
sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether a covered official may have 
violated any Federal Criminal law (other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or an 
infraction). Once the Attomey General receives this information, she has 30 days in 
which to determine whether there are grounds to investigate.”  In making this 
determination, she shall only consider (A) the specificity o f the information received; and 
(B) the credibility of the source of the information.” If within the 30-day period, the 
Attomey General determines that the information is not specific or is not from a credible 
source, then the Attomey General shall close the matter. If she finds to the contrary, she 
shall commence a preliminary investigation. If she cannot determine whether the
30
31
32
33
28 u s e  591(b)(West 1998 supp).
28 u s e  § 591(c)(West 1998 supp). An example o f a person who was not 
enumerated under the statute, but prosecuted, is Jim Guy Tucker, former govemor 
o f  Arkansas. He was prosecuted with respect to his relationship to the failure of 
the Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan, as part of the Whitewater prosecution.
As Govemor o f Arkansas, Mr. Tucker was not among the enumerated persons in 
the statute, but was nevertheless prosecuted by the Independent Counsel because 
o f  his relationship to the ongoing investigation of enumerated persons. US v 
Tucker, 73 F3d 1313 (8th Cir 1996).
28 u s e  § 591(d)(2).
28 u s e  § 591(d)(l)(West supp 1998).
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information is specific and credible, she shall commence a preliminary investigation with 
respect to that information.”  If the information concerns the Attomey General or a 
person who has a personal or financial relationship with the Attomey General, she must 
recuse herself and the next most senior Justice official must perform her duties under the 
statute.”
Once the Attomey General begins her preliminary investigation, she has 
90 days in which to determine whether further investigation is warranted.”  When she has 
completed the investigation, or 90 days has elapsed, she reports to a panel of three judges, 
referred to as the Special Division.”  If the Attomey General determines there are no 
further grounds for investigation, she informs the panel and no Independent Counsel is 
appointed. The Attomey General’s decision is not reviewable by any court.”  If the 
Attomey General determines that further investigation is proper or has not made a 
determination and filed a notification by the time deadline, she must apply to the Special 
Division for the appointment o f an Independent Counsel.”  The application must contain 
information to help the Special Division to choose an Independent Counsel and define his
34
35
36
37
38
39
28 u s e  § 591(d)(2)(West supp. 1998).
28 u s e  § 591(e). In USvMcDougal, 906 F.Supp 499 (EDArk 1996), Attomey 
General Janet Reno referred the investigation of the Whitewater matter to an 
Independent Counsel based on a political conflict o f interest for the Justice 
Department. Susan McDougal, the subject o f an investigation in the Whitewater 
matter, challenged the appointment on the grounds that Reno did not file a notice 
o f recusal. The court held that a political conflict o f interest did not require a 
written notice o f recusal, whereas a financial or personal conflict would, thus the 
appointment was proper.
28 u s e  § 592(a)(1).
The Special Division has authority under 28 USC § 49. It is a three-judge panel 
o f circuit justices appointed by the Chief Justice o f the United States. The justices 
serve 2-year terms. One justice must come from the District of Columbia Circuit, 
and no two judges may be appointed from the same circuit.
28 USC § 592(f). US v Tucker, 78 F3d 1313 (8th Cir 1996). See also Dellums v 
Smith, 797 F2d 817 (9th Cir 1986)(private citizens have no standing to challenge 
attomey general’s decision in recommending or failing to recommend 
independent counsel).
28 USC § 592(c).
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jurisdiction, “so that the Independent Counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate 
and prosecute the subject matter and all matters related to that subject matter.""*
The Special Division then appoints the Independent Counsel and defines 
his jurisdiction."' The Independent Counsel should be “an individual who has 
appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a 
prompt, responsible, and cost-effective maimer.""^ The Special Division defines the 
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, and is charged with assuring that he has “adequate 
authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject m atter... and all matters related to 
that subject matter.""^ The jurisdiction also includes the authority to investigate and 
prosecute Federal crimes, other than those classified as Class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions, that may arise out o f the investigation or prosecution o f the matter with 
respect to which the Attomey General’s request was made, including perjury, obstmction 
of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation o f witnesses."" This provision, as 
well as related provisions dealing with the scope o f the Independent Counsel’s authority, 
is the subject of numerous challenges."^
If the Attomey General so requests, the Special Division may expand an 
existing Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, rather than appoint a new Independent 
Counsel. The Attomey General may receive information about a potential investigation
40
41
42
43
44
45
28 USC § 592(d).
28 USC § 593(b)(1).
28 USC § 593(b)(2).
28 USC § 593(b)(3). See USvSecord, 725 FSupp 563 (DDC 1989), in which 
defendant Secord moved to dismiss indictments against him based on lack of 
prosecutorial jurisdiction. Defendant’s alleged crimes of perjury before Congress 
were committed after the Independent Counsel was appointed. The court held 
that the scope of the jurisdictional order “to seek indictments and to prosecute any 
persons or entities involved in any o f the foregoing events or transactions” [Iran- 
Contra] was broad enough to include defendant’s alleged perjury before Congress.
28 USC § 593(b)(3).
In one case. In re Espy, 80 F3d 501 (DC Cir 1996), the court commented that 43 
motions challenging the scope of the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction had 
already been filed during the investigation.
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independently and make the determination whether to submit it to the Special Division, 
or the Independent Counsel may submit a request to the Attomey General asking for 
expansion of jurisdiction, if he finds information about persons not covered in the grant 
o f jurisdiction violating criminal laws."* If the Independent Counsel requests expansion 
of his jurisdiction, the Attomey General shall give great weight to his 
recommendations."’ Again, if the Attomey General decides not to submit the expansion 
o f the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction to the Special Division, it is not reviewable. If 
she does submit the request, the Special Division then expands the Independent Counsel’s 
jurisdiction."*
In addition to appointing a counsel and defining his jurisdiction, the 
Special Division also has the duty of awarding attomey s’ fees to persons who were the 
subject o f investigation, but did not get indicted. The fees must be reasonable, must have 
been incurred during the investigation, and must be fees which would not have been 
incurred but for the requirements o f The Act."’ This provision o f The Act is strictly 
constmed,”  making it difficult to obtain attomeys’ fees. The “but for” requirement is 
satisfied when either 1) the subject o f the investigation is prejudiced by the Department of 
Justice’s failure to comply with substantive protective features o f The Act; 2) the 
Independent Counsel's investigation constituted a substantial duplication o f prior 
investigations; or 3) the case could have been disposed o f at an earlier stage if the 
Attomey General had not been limited by the statutory restrictions on her preliminary
46
47
48
49
50
28 USC § 593(c).
28 USC § 593(c)(2). When the Independent Counsel submits information to the 
Attomey General about persons not covered by the original order granting 
jurisdiction, the Attomey General must follow the procedure set out in 28 USC 
§ 592. In re Meese, 907 F2d 1192 (DC Cir 1990).
28 USC § 593(c)(2)(C).
28 USC 593(f)(West supp 1998).
In re Nofaiger, 925 F2d 428 (DC 1991).
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investigation, resulting in the appointment o f an Independent Counsel.” Despite this 
high standard, the Special Division has awarded fees in proper circumstances.”
Once appointed, the Independent Counsel has full power and independent 
authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers o f the 
Department of Justice, the Attomey General, and any other officer or employee of the 
Department of Justice, including conducting grand jury proceedings, engaging in civil 
and criminal litigation, appealing any decision in which he participates, reviewing 
documentary evidence from any source, contesting privileges, receiving and challenging 
national security clearances, determining immunity, subpoenaing tax retums, and 
initiating and conducting indictments and prosecutions.”  The Independent Counsel’s 
power is the subject of many attacks, as it is “both wide in perimeter and fuzzy at the 
borders."”  The attacks often focus on the power conferred under 28 U.S.C. § 594 to refer 
to the Independent Counsel other matters related to his jurisdiction, which can 
significantly broaden the matters and/or persons being investigated. In a referral case, the 
Independent Counsel can request referral of a related matter directly from the Special 
Division.”  The Attomey General need not concur for the Special Division to approve the 
referral.”  Relatedness depends on the procedural and factual link between the 
Independent Counsel’s original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter sought to be
52
54
55
56
Ibid. at 438-39.
See In re Mullins, 87 F3d 1372 (DC Cir 1996)(Former President Bush’s 
conununications assistant reimbursed for fees incurred as a result o f investigation 
into government inquiries into presidential candidate’s citizenship status during 
Vietnam.) In re Meese, supra (reasonable fees awarded).
28 USC §§ 594(a)(l)-(10).
US V Wilson, 26 F3d 142 (DC Cir 1994)(Independent Counsel Arlin Adam’s 
investigation of Housing S e c re t^  Pierce which consensually overlapped with 
Department of Justice investigation held not to exceed its jurisdiction. 
Overlapping investigations held permissible, as long as Department of Justice 
does not subvert Independent Counsel’s investigation).
28 USC § 594(e).
In re Espy, 80 F3d 501,507 (DC Cir 1996).
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referred.”  During the investigation, the Independent Counsel must comply with the 
policies o f the Department o f  Justice and has full authority to dismiss matters within his 
jurisdiction.’*
The Independent Counsel receives a goverrunent salary, an office, and 
many resources. He is entitled to hire employees, including attomeys, investigators, and 
consultants, and may request assistance from the Department of Justice in carrying out his 
functions. With resources, come cost controls. The Independent Counsel is required to 
conduct all activities with due regard for expense, authorize only reasonable and lawful 
expenditures, and assign the duty o f certifying all expenditures to one employee.”
The Independent Counsel must file three types of reports. Every six 
months he must file a report summarizing major expenses and estimating future 
expenses,** which is audited and/or reviewed by the Comptroller General.*' Every year 
he must submit a report to Congress detailing all activities and giving the status of 
investigations or prosecutions.*’ Finally, before the termination o f his office, he must file 
a final report setting forth a description o f his work, including the disposition o f all cases 
brought.*’ The final report, as well as intermediate reports and court filings, may be 
publicly disclosed under certain circumstances.*"
57
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60 
61 
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Ibid.
28 USC § 594(e).
28 USC § 594(1).
28 USC 594(h)(1)(A).
28 USC § 596(c).
28 USC § 595(a)(2)(West supp 1998).
28 USC § 594(h)(1)(B).
The determination o f whether the report or filings will be made public considers 
1 ) whether the subjects o f the investigation have already been disclosed; 2) 
whether or not the subjects object; 3) whether the report or filings contain 
information already known; and 4) whether the report or filings consist of legal 
and factual rulings which should be publicly available to understand the court’s 
rules and precedents. In re North, 16 F3d 1234 (CADC 1994)(allowing 
publication o f Iran Contra Final Report).
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An Independent Counsel’s tenure is terminated in one o f two ways.
Unless he is impeached and convicted, the Independent Counsel may be removed from 
office only by the Attomey General for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any 
condition which substantially impairs his performance.*’ If the Attomey General 
removes the Independent Counsel, she must submit a report to the Special Division, and 
the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate.”  The Independent Counsel may seek 
judicial review of his removal.”
The second way is by termination o f the investigation. The Independent 
Counsel may terminate the investigation by notifying the Attomey General and filing the 
final report.** The Special Division may also terminate the investigation on its own 
motion or by request o f the Attomey General by determining that all prosecutions or 
investigations are substantially completed.*’ The Department of Justice may then assume 
responsibility for the remainder of the work. If the Attomey General does not make this 
request, the Special Division shall determine on its own motion whether termination is 
appropriate under this paragraph no later than 2 years after the appointment o f an 
Independent Counsel, at the end of the succeeding 2 year period, and thereafter at the end 
of each succeeding 1 year period.™
Although minimized in the media. Congress does have oversight of the 
Independent Counsel and the Independent Counsel must cooperate in the exercise o f that
65
66 
6? 
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28 USC § 596(a)(1).
28 USC § 596(a)(2).
28 USC § 596(a)(3).
28 USC § 596(b).
In In re North, 10 F3d 831 (DC Cir 1993), a suggestion to review the Independent 
Counsel’s tenure was made by President Reagan’s lawyers. The Special Division 
considered the request and issued an Order to Show Cause to Independent 
Counsel Walsh why the investigation should not be terminated.
28 USC § 596(b)(2)(West supp 1998). This provision was added by the 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994.
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oversight.” Further, the Independent Counsel must advise the House o f Representatives 
of any “substantial and credible information which such Independent Counsel receives, in 
carrying out the Independent Counsel’s responsibilities under this chapter, that may 
constitute grounds for an impeachment.
The foregoing has shown that the Independent Counsel Act does confer 
significant power on the appointee. The next chapter discusses the constitutionality of 
The Act as a whole and the specific provisions which have been unsuccessfully 
challenged.
”  28 USC § 595.
28 USC § 595(c). Neither the Special Division nor the Independent Counsel has 
the authority to impeach anyone; if  the Independent Counsel receives information 
that may constitute grounds for impeachment, he is to advise the House of 
Representatives. In re Visser, 968 F2d 1319, 1322 (1992).
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Virtually every article that discusses the Independent Counsel asks 
whether the Independent Counsel Act is constitutional. It is. In Morrison v Olson, the 
Supreme Court held that the Independent Counsel Act violated neither the Appointments 
Clause, Article III, nor the separation of powers doctrine.’  ̂ Justice Scalia filed the only 
dissent and Justice Kennedy took no part in deciding the case. Many have criticized the 
Court’s opinion. Constitutional scholars found it a surprising decision, in which the 
Court departed from its usual pattern of examining constitutional history for guidance. In 
Morrison v Olson, critics argue, the Court treated constitutional history as virtually 
irrelevant and subordinated it to policy concerns, which earlier decisions had ignored. '̂* 
Morrison v. Olson was, at heart, a political dispute. Two subcommittees 
of the House o f Representatives subpoenaed documents from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) regarding the enforcement o f Superfund laws. The President, 
on the advice o f the Justice Department, instructed the EPA to invoke executive privilege 
on certain sensitive documents. The House o f Representatives then held the EPA 
Administrator in contempt for claiming executive privilege, after which the EPA and the
73
74
Morrison v Olson, 108 SCt 2597 (1988).
Carter, 110. Citing cases such as INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983), and Buckley 
V Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), which held laws unconstitutional based on the framers’ 
intent to separate the powers o f the branches. Carter calls the Morrison opinion 
startling. “A little constitutional language, no constitutional history, a dash o f 
deference, and the case is done.”
16
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United States filed suit against the House of Representatives. The parties settled the 
matter until the following year, when the House o f Representatives started investigating 
the Justice Department’s role in advising the President to invoke executive privilege and 
further accused certain individuals o f giving false and misleading testimony and 
wrongfully withholding documents. The House o f Representatives sought appointment 
of an Independent Counsel through proper channels, and one was appointed.^’ The 
subjects o f the investigation challenged the appointment o f the Independent Counsel on 
three constitutional grounds: the Appointments Clause, Article 111, and the separation of 
powers doctrine. The Circuit Court declared the statute unconstitutional, and the 
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion.
The Appointments Clause
The Court first considered whether the appointment o f the Independent
Counsel violated the Appointments Clause o f the Constitution. The Appointments
Clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment o f 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, or in the Courts o f Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.’*
Since the Special Division has the power to appoint the Independent 
Counsel, the Independent Counsel must be an inferior officer in order to satisfy the 
Appointments Clause. If the Independent Counsel is a principal officer, then she must be 
appointed by the President with the advise and consent o f the Senate.” The Court 
”  Ibid., 2607.
’* U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
”  For purposes of appointments, the constitution divides officers into two classes:
principal and inferior. Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 508,509 (1976).
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determined that The Act did not violate the Appointments Clause because the 
Independent Counsel was indeed an inferior officer. The Court cited four factors which 
led to its conclusion that the Independent Counsel was an inferior officer.’*
The first factor was that the Independent Counsel is subject to removal by 
a higher Executive Branch official. Although independent, the Independent Counsel may 
be removed by the Attorney General. The fact that she may be removed indicates that she 
is inferior in rank and authority to the Attorney General and the President.”  Second, the 
Independent Counsel is empowered to perform limited duties, although she has broad 
discretion and power in exercising those duties. Nevertheless, she has no authority to 
formulate policy and she has no duties outside o f her investigation.*® Third, the 
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction is limited, both in the possible subjects o f 
investigation and the scope conferred by the Special Division.*' Finally, the Independent 
Counsel’s office is limited in tenure. Once the task is complete, the Independent 
Counsel’s tenure is over, although there is no specified time limit.*’
In support o f its conclusion, the Court compared the Independent Counsel 
to other inferior officers, citing several cases. The most notable is United States v 
Mxon," where the Court referred to the Watergate Special Prosecutor as a “subordinate
78
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83
Ibid., 2608.
Morrison v Olson, 2608-09.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. Subsequent to Morrison, Congress amended the Ethics in Government Act 
in 1994 to provide that if the Attorney General did not so request, the Special 
Division could determine whether termination o f the Independent Counsel is 
appropriate not later than two years after the appointment, at the end of the next 
two year period and thereafter every year. 28 USC § 596(b)(2). This amendment 
was foimd constitutional in US v McDougal, 906 FSupp 494 (ED Ark 1995). 
Although providing for review, the same conditions exist for termination: that all 
investigations or prosecutions are substantially completed.
418 US 683, 694 (1974). In United States v Nixon, the Attorney General 
conferred power and authority upon the Special Prosecutor by regulation. Under 
Article II, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the 
criminal litigation of the United States. The Attorney General also has the power
...(continued)(continued... )
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officer.” Other inferior officers cited by the Court included: temporary vice-coimsels,*^ 
election supervisors,** and United States commissioners.**
The last Appointments Clause issue addressed by the Court was whether 
the Special Division’s appointment o f the Independent Counsel was proper, since it was 
an interbranch appointment. The language of the Appointments Clause answers that 
question in the affirmative, allowing Congress to vest the appointment o f inferior officers 
in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads o f departments.*’ However, if one 
branch’s appointment o f another branch’s officers had the potential to impair the 
constitutional functions assigned to one o f the branches, it could violate the separation of 
powers doctrine.** Here, the Court did not believe that allowing the Special Division to 
appoint the Independent Counsel would impair the Special Division’s constitutional 
functions. In fact, the Court reasoned, courts have appointed prosecutors*’ and U.S. 
commissioners’® in other situations, therefore the interbranch appointment o f the 
Independent Counsel was also proper.
...(continued)
to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 
u s e  §§ 509, 510,515,533. The Special Prosecutor was one such subordinate 
officer.
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United States v Eton, 169 US 331 (1898).
Ex parte Siebold, 100 US (10 Otto) 371 (1880).
Go-Bart Importing Co. v United States, 282 US 344 (1931).
Challengers of the Act argued that even though Congress vested the appointment 
o f inferior officers to either the President, the courts, or department heads, it 
meant to limit the appointment o f  inferior officers to the branch under which they 
belong. The effect o f this argument is that only the President may appoint inferior 
executive officers. The Court rejected this argument, claiming it had no support 
in the Constitution. Two cases discuss this issue. In Ex Parte Hennen, 38 US (13 
Pet.) 257-58, the Court stated “The appointing power here designated, in the latter 
part o f the [Clause], was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department of 
the government to which the officer to be appointed most appropriately 
belonged.” In Ex Parte Siebold, supra, the Court said that rule stated in Hennen 
was the usual and proper procedure, but not absolutely required.
Morrison v Olson, 2611.
Young V United States ex rel Viutton et Fils SA, 481 US 787 (1987).
Go-Bart Importing Co. v United States, 344.
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Although Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v Olson concentrated on 
separation of powers arguments, he did address the Court’s Appointments Clause 
arguments. He disagreed with the Court’s analysis o f the factors cited, disputing that the 
Independent Counsel is removable at will, limited in power, limited in tenure, and limited 
in jurisdiction. First, he argued the fact that the Independent Counsel is removable for 
cause does not suggest that she is an inferior officer. Rather, the fact that the Independent 
Counsel is harder to remove than principal officers (who are removable at will) supports 
the contrary.” Second, he argued that the Independent Counsel is not limited in power 
because it has the full power and authority o f the Department of Justice, which is 
substantial in scope.”  Third, Justice Scalia attacked the Court’s characterization o f the 
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction and tenure as limited. The Independent Counsel at 
issue in Morrison v Olson had already served more than two years, longer than some 
cabinet officials.”  Since there are no limits on the length o f the Independent Counsel’s 
investigation, there are no true limits on the tenure o f the office.
Instead o f the factors the Court considered in determining that the 
Independent Counsel is an inferior officer, Scalia followed the test o f the Constitution 
and the division of power it established. Scalia argued that the Independent Counsel is 
not an inferior officer because she is not subordinate to any officer in the Executive 
Branch.”  Because the Independent Counsel is guaranteed independence, she is not
91
92
93
94
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 2633. Since Morrison v Olson, at least five Independent Counsels have had 
investigations lasting three years or longer: Lawrence Walsh (Iran Contra), 
Kenneth Starr (Whitewater), Donald Smaltz (Mike Espy), James Barrett (Henry 
Cisneros), and Larry Thompson (Sealed). Wilkinson and Ellis, 1527.
In Edmond v US, 117 SCt 1573 (1997), Scalia wrote the opinion o f the court in a 
case challenging the constitutionality o f the Secretary o f Transportation 
appointing civilian judges to the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. One of 
the issues was whether the civilian judges were inferior or principal officers.
Scalia cites the factors listed by the Court in Morrison v Olson, but states that the 
court did not purport to set forth a test. Rather, the inquiry comes down to 
whether or not the officer has a superior, which the civilian judges do. Justice
...(continued)(continued...)
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subordinate to either the President or the Attorney General. Therefore, her appointment 
by anyone other than the President is unconstitutional.
Article III
The next issue addressed in Morrison v Olson was whether the powers of 
the Special Division violated Article III. Article III limits judicial power to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”’* Generally, executive or administrative duties o f a nonjudicial nature 
may not be imposed on judges holding office under Article III.’* Since the Special 
Division’s responsibilities under The Act include appointing the Independent Counsel, 
defining her jurisdiction, granting extensions for investigations, receiving reports, 
referring related matters, granting attorneys’ fees to individuals who are not indicted, 
determining whether to grant protective orders, determining whether to release the final 
report to the public, and terminating the Independent Counsel when her duties are 
completed, there is an issue as to whether these duties exceed the bounds of Article 111.
In analyzing the issue, the Court divided the Special Division’s duties into 
three categories: appointment and jurisdiction, ministerial duties (receiving reports, 
granting extensions, referring related matters, granting fees), and termination. With 
regard to the first category, the Special Division is expressly given the power to appoint 
the Independent Counsel by the Appointments Clause.”  Consequently, the Court 
reasoned, the Special Division must have some discretion in defining the scope o f the 
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, particularly where, as here. Congress created a
...(continued)
Souter concurred in the opinion, but did not agree that the consideration of 
whether the officer has a superior is sufficient to establish an inferior officer, 
citing the remainder of the Morrison v Olson factors.
U.S. Constitution, Article III.
Buckley V Valeo, 123.
Morrison v Olson, 2612.
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temporary position whose duties vary with the factual circumstances.’* However, the 
jurisdiction conferred by the Special Division must be demonstrably related to the factual 
circumstances giving rise to the investigation and request for appointment.”  As long as 
the grant o f jurisdiction satisfies this condition, the power to define and expand the 
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction is incidental to the power to appoint, thus 
constitutional.'®®
Second, the Court considered whether the administrative duties o f the 
Special Division, such as receiving reports on various matters, granting attorneys’ fees 
petitions, deciding to release the counsel’s final report and granting or denying protective 
orders, violated Article III. In order to violate Article 111, these administrative duties 
would have to either encroach upon executive or legislative authority, or be more 
properly accomplished by those other branches.'®' In this case, the Court held that the 
Special Divisions’ duties neither encroached upon executive or legislative authority or 
were more properly accomplished by the other branches. These miscellaneous duties 
were analogous to functions judges perform in other contexts and were simply 
ministerial. Since these provisions o f The Act do not give the Special Division the power 
to supervise the Independent Counsel in the exercise o f her investigative or prosecutorial 
authority, they do not violate Article III.
Third, with regard to the power o f the Special Division to terminate the 
duties of the Independent Counsel when it determines that the prosecutions are complete, 
the Court expressed discomfort because termination in this manner is not a traditional 
judicial power. Nevertheless, the Court did not view it as a significant judicial
’* Morrison v Olson, 2613.
”  Ibid.
'°° Morrison v Olson, 2613, fh. 17.
'®' Ibid.
102 Ibid., 2614.
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encroachment upon executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the 
Independent Counsel.'®* Further, the Court narrowed the interpretation o f The Act so that 
the Special Division does not have the power to remove the counsel while an 
investigation or court proceeding is still underway, a power which is vested solely in the 
Attorney General. Termination may occur only when the counsel’s duties are completed 
or so substantially completed that there remains no need for action.'®’' Consequently, the 
Court did not believe that The Act violated Article III o f the Constitution.
Separation of Powers
The last challenge discussed by the Court, and the definitive one for 
Justice Scalia, is that The Act violates the principle o f separation of powers because the 
President neither has the power to remove or control the Independent Counsel, an 
Executive Branch officer. The Majority admitted that the Independent Counsel was an 
Executive Branch officer'®* and defined the separation o f powers analysis as ( 1 ) whether 
the provision o f The Act restricting the Attorney General’s power to remove the 
Independent Counsel to only those instances in which she can show “good cause”, taken 
by itself, impermissibly interferes with the President’s exercise of his constitutionally 
appointed functions; and (2) whether, taken as a whole. The Act violates the principle of 
separation of powers by reducing the President’s ability to control the prosecutorial 
powers wielded by the Independent Counsel.
Removal
The constitutional arguments challenging the President’s power to remove 
the Independent Counsel are based on several major Supreme Court cases.
'®* Ibid., 2614.
"" Ibid., 2615.
105 Morrison v Olson, 2619.
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In Myers v United S t a t e s the Court considered a law which allowed the 
removal of certain postmasters by the President only with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. The Court issued a 70-page opinion, fully researched with many historical 
references. It held that the statute was unconstitutional because Congress could not give 
to itself the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of the power to 
remove an Executive Branch official. Only the President may remove an Executive 
Branch official.
Ten years later in Humphrey's Executor v United States, the Court 
considered a statute which limited the President's removal o f the Federal Trade 
Commissioner only for malfeasance, neglect o f duty or inefficiency. The Court 
determined that the Federal Trade Commissioner’s duties were quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial, rather than purely executive like the Postmaster in Afyer5.'“® Accordingly, 
Congress may fix the period o f service and the conditions for removal in order to assure 
discharge of the Commissioner’s duties independent o f Executive Branch control.'®’ In 
essence, the Court held that the character of the office will determine whether Congress 
can condition the removal of an officer. If the office was not purely executive, then the 
President’s removal power could be limited.
In Weiner v United5/a/«, "° decided in 1958, the Court addressed whether 
the President had unfettered discretion to remove a member o f the War Claims 
Commission, which had been established by Congress in the War Claims Act of 1948. 
The Commission’s function was to receive and adjudicate certain claims for 
compensation from those who had suffered personal injury or property damage at the
106
107
108 
109
no
272 US 52(1926).
Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935). 
Ibid., 628.
Ibid., 630.
357 US 349(1958).
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hands o f the enemy during World War II. Commissioners were appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but the statute made no provision for 
the removal o f officers, perhaps because the Commission itself was to have a limited 
existence. As in Humphrey’s, however, the Commissioners were entrusted by Congress 
with adjudicatory powers that were to be exercised free from executive control."' 
Consequently, the Court held that the President did not have unfettered discretion to 
remove such an official.
Finally, in Bowsher v Synar, decided in 1986, the Court addressed 
whether the powers vested in the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s power to 
remove Executive Branch officers. Under that Act, the Comptroller General was required 
to exercise executive functions."* Since the Comptroller General was removable only by 
Congress, that Act gave Congress power over an official who was executing the laws, 
which is a power that Congress cannot have under the Constitution. Since the 
Constitution does not give Congress the power to execute the laws. Congress could not 
grant that power to an officer under its control, and that provision of the Act was deemed 
unconstitutional."^
As shown, at least until Morrison v Olson, the constitutional analysis of 
the President’s ability to remove a particular official revolved around that official's duties, 
i.e. purely executive, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, or somewhere in-between. After 
reviewing the above cases, the Court in Morrison v Olson decided that the case before it
111
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Weiner v United States, 356.
478 US 714 (1986).
The Comptroller General is an officer o f the United States who is nominated by 
the President from a list o f three provided by the House o f Representatives. 
He/She is confirmed by the Senate and removable only at the initiative of 
Congress. The office was established to be an office at the control o f Congress. 
Ibid., 726.
Bowsher v Synar, 726.
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was neither like Bowsher nor Myers, where Congress had involved itself in the removal 
of an Executive Branch official. Here, the power to remove the Independent Counsel is 
in the hands o f the Executive Branch, specifically the Attorney General, who may remove 
the Independent Counsel for physical or mental disability, for good cause, or by 
impeachment and conviction.
The Court found that this case was more aptly analogized to Humphrey's 
and Weiner because in those cases the officials at issue were entrusted with powers which 
were to be exercised free from executive control. However, the Court did not use the 
quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial analysis to determine that the character o f the office of 
the Independent Counsel was something other than purely executive,"* which would have 
restricted the President’s removal power. Rather, the Court reasoned “that the 
determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good cause 
type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on 
whether or not that official is classified as "purely executive.’""* The real question was 
whether the removal restrictions were of such a nature that they impeded the President’s 
ability to perform his constitutional duties. Applying this analysis, the Court 
recharacterized Humphrey's and Weiner, explaining that the distinctions based on the 
(unctions o f the office were a reflection o f the importance of the President’s ability to 
remove the officials to his exercise o f constitutional duties. In sum, the Court changed 
the analysis from concentrating on the type o f official (purely executive, quasi-legislative, 
etc.) to analyzing the extent that the removal restriction impeded the President’s exercise 
of his constitutional duties.
I I S
116
The Court could not use this analysis in this case because the functions o f the 
Independent Counsel, as admitted by the Court and supported by extensive case 
law, are purely executive functions. The executive branch has the power to 
enforce the law, and the duties of a prosecutor are the embodiment o f that power.
Morrison v Olson, 2618.
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Applying the reasoning to the case at issue, the Court considered the good 
cause requirement for removing the Independent Counsel, and concluded that it by itself 
did not “unduly trammel” on executive authority. Noting that the Independent Counsel is 
an inferior officer, the Court stated “we do not see how the President’s need to control the 
exercise o f that [the Independent Counsel’s] discretion is so central to the functioning of 
the Executive Branch as to require as a matter o f constitutional law that the counsel be 
terminable at will by the President.""’ In addition, since the President retains control 
over the Independent Counsel through the Attorney General, he is not impermissibly 
burdened in his power to control or supervise the Independent Counsel in the execution o f 
her duties under The Act. Consequently, the removal restrictions under The Act were not 
unconstitutional.
The Act as a Whole
The last issue the Court considered was whether The Act, taken as a 
whole, violated the principle of separation o f powers by unduly interfering with the role 
of the Executive Branch. Although the three branches o f government do not and have 
never been held to operate with absolute independence, if one branch is trying to increase 
its power at the expense o f another, or one branch is usurping the power of another, it 
may violate the separation o f powers doctrine, which is the basis for our system of 
government."* Here, the Court held, neither Congress nor the Judiciary was trying to 
increase its own power at the expense o f the Executive, nor was either usurping Executive 
power, therefore The Act did not violate the separation of powers principle.
In the case of Congress, Congress has very little role in the application of 
The Act. With the exception of the power o f impeachment (which applies to all officers 
o f the U.S.), Congress retained for itself no powers o f control or supervision over the
" ’ Ibid., 2619.
"* Ibid., 2620, citing United States v Nixon, 418 US 683,707 (1974).
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Independent Counsel."’ Congress may request the appointment of a Counsel from the 
Attorney General, but the Attorney General may refuse. Furthermore, Congress has 
rights to information and oversight, but those are functions incidental to the legislative 
function of Congress.'”  Accordingly, Congress is not increasing its power at the expense 
o f the Executive Branch.
Nor does The Act work any judicial usurpation of properly executive 
function. Other than the powers o f appointment, discussed earlier, the court has no power 
to supervise or control the activities of the counsel.” '
Finally, The Act does not impermissibly undermine the power o f the 
Executive Branch or disrupt the proper balance between the coordinate branches by 
preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.'”  Although it reduces the amoimt o f control and supervision that the Attorney 
General and President exercise over the investigation and prosecution o f a certain class of 
alleged criminal activity,'”  the Attorney General has several ways to supervise or control 
the powers o f the Independent Counsel. She may remove the Independent Counsel for 
good cause, providing the President with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed by the Independent Counsel. She also controls the initial appointment 
o f the Independent Counsel and to some extent, the definition of his jurisdiction by 
submitting certain facts to the Special Division. In addition, the requirement to abide by 
Justice Department policy also acts as a control on the Independent Counsel. 
Consequently, even though the Independent Counsel is free from executive supervision to 
a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, these features of The Act give the
119
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Morrison v Olson, 2620.
Ibid., citing McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135,174 (1927).
Morrison v Olson, 2621.
Ibid., 2621, citing Nixon v Administrator o f  General Services, 433 US 425,443 
(1977).
Morrison v Olson, 2621.
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Executive Branch sufficient control over the Independent Counsel to ensure that the 
President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.'”
Justice Scalia’s dissent concentrated on the principle o f separation of 
powers. His main argument is that once one determines that the conduct o f a criminal 
investigation and prosecution is purely an executive power, then one must determine 
whether The Act deprives the President of exclusive control over the exercise o f that 
power.'”  He disagrees with the Majority’s analysis revolving around the extent that the 
removal power impedes on the President’s exercise o f his duties. In his opinion, the 
Independent Coimsel is a purely executive officer, thus he should be removable at will by 
the President.
In support o f his alternative test, Scalia argues that the conduct of a 
criminal investigation and prosecution is purely an Executive Branch power, citing 
several cases in support.'”  Prosecutors make policy decisions in investigating crimes, 
including deciding who to prosecute, which crimes to pursue, and how to use the 
subpoena power. Taking supervisory power o f these activities away from the President 
usurps the core o f the executive function.'”  Because the Constitution grants all 
Executive Power to the President, any distinction the Court makes as to how central the 
need to control the Independent Counsel is to the President’s constitutional duties is 
invalid to Justice Scalia.'”
Since prosecution is a purely Executive Branch function. Justice Scalia 
argues, then the only relevant question to ask is whether the President has exclusive
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Ibid., 2622.
Ibid., 2626.
Morrison, 2627. Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a 
quintessentially executive function. Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 832 (1985); 
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 138 (1976); United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,693 
(1974).
Ibid., 2628.
Morrison, 2628 (dissent).
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control o f the prosecutor’s removal. Here, the President does not, thus The Act must 
violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Justice Scalia disagrees with the Majority’s contention that the President, 
through the Attorney General, has control over the Independent Counsel. The good cause 
restriction on removal serves more as an impediment to removal than as a control. The 
discretion of the Attomey General to request an appointment is not a control, as the Court 
believes, but is so “insubstantial that the Attomey General’s discretion is severely 
confined."'”  When a request for appointment has come from Congress, the Attomey 
general must explain any denial to the Congress. Practically, it would be surprising if the 
Attomey General had any choice but to seek appointment o f an Independent Counsel to 
pursue the charges, particularly where there is evidence against the person charged. 
Further, once the referral is made, the Special Division determines the scope and duration 
of the investigation, not the Attomey General. Most importantly, once appointed, the 
Independent Counsel exercises executive power free from the President’s control.'”
Since the President’s power to remove the Independent Counsel is so limited. The Act 
violates the separation o f powers doctrine.
However, the purpose o f The Act wzis to curb the Executive’s power, 
when investigating transgressions by those in his Administration. Should the President 
still have such exclusive power, even when alleged crimes by him or his close associates 
are at issue? In effect. Justice Scalia answers in the affirmative. It is a price we pay for 
liberty, to preserve the separation of powers and our system n f checks and balances. 
Allowing the President to wield all o f the executive power, even when it involves 
possible crimes committed by himself or those close to him is no different than when
'”  Morrison v Olson., 2627.
'”  Ibid., 2627.
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Congress exempts itself from laws it passes'*' or when the Supreme Court has the power 
to pronounce the final decision on the constitutionality o f a statute reducing its salaries.'*’ 
The President’s power can be checked constitutionally by the power to impeach a 
President who fails to enforce the laws. Further, there is a political check by the people 
who elected the President. They may vote him out of office.
Finally, Justice Scalia comments on the political effects o f  The Act. It 
chills speech between the President and his advisors if  they have no protection. It allows 
Congress to trigger an investigation rather than bring impeachment proceedings against a 
President, proceedings which may hurt their political futures. The investigations 
themselves become a source o f constant political damage and are widely publicized and 
much too long.'** The Independent Counsel has immense power and the danger o f that 
power combined with unlimited resources and a staff o f  those devoted to the cause 
without the political check of removal by the President, creates a mini-executive: narrow, 
focused and unlimited. “1 fear the Court has permanently encumbered the Republic with 
an institution that will do it great harm."'*'*
In the years since Morrison v Olson, many have agreed with Justice 
Scalia’s arguments. The dissent has been widely cited in articles that call for The Act’s 
repeal. But the The Act is not likely to be overmled in the near future, since ten Justices 
supported its constitutionality. It is up to Congress to determine the future o f  The Act.
'*' Justice Scalia cites the Civil Rights Act o f 1964, Title VII, 42 USC section 2000e
as an example.
'*’ United States v. Will, 449 US 200,211-217(1980).
'** Morrison v Olson, 2631.
'*' Ibid., 2641.
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
From its beginnings in the early 70’s, the Ethics in Government Act has 
been controversial. The original act contained a sunset clause providing that The Act 
would expire in December o f 1982. While Congress re-authorized The Act in 1983, and 
again in 1987 and 1994, it has amended The Act in important ways in response to public 
policy concerns raised by its application. This chapter examines many of the changes 
made and the impetus for such changes.
As previously discussed, the policy behind The Act is to ensure 
independent investigation o f high-level executive officials. After Watergate, many 
believed it made sense to separate the investigators from those being investigated, to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety and to ensure that the investigations would be fair 
and impartial.'** However, perceived abuses precipitated amendments to The Act. The 
1983 Amendments to The Act were influenced by the investigations o f three Carter 
officials, Jordan, Kraft, and Donovan, none of which resulted in criminal charges. Critics 
alleged that The Act was too easily engaged and that the scope o f The Act was too broad, 
thus the amendments changed the standard for commencing a preliminary investigation.
135 See Offutt V. United States, 348 US 11, 14 (1954)(“Justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.”). See also American Bar Association, ABA Model Code o f  
Professional Responsibility, Canon 9 (I979)(“a lawyer should avoid even the 
appearance of professional impropriety.”)
32
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While the Reagan Administration opposed The Act on constitutional and cost grounds, it 
later dropped its opposition because the public still favored The Act.'”
In 1987, The Act was up for reauthorization and more than half a dozen 
investigations had already been launched. Reagan Attomey General William French 
Smith opposed reauthorization, claiming that the process o f Independent Counsel 
investigation was “cmel and devastating in its application to individuals, falsely 
destroying reputations and requiring the incurring of great personal costs.”'*’ The second 
Reagan Administration, with at least four pending investigations o f its advisers, launched 
constitutional attacks on the bill, resulting in the Morrison v Olson Supreme Court 
decision. Democrats, on the other hand, vigorously supported The Act in 1987. Leading 
Senate Sponsor Carl Levin made comparisons between the pending investigations and 
Watergate, claiming that The Act had restored public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.'** The Act was reauthorized in 1987, with overwhelming support, and President 
Reagan was forced to sign it. One day later, the Office of the Independent Counsel 
secured its first conviction under The Act, that of Reagan official Michael Deaver, for 
peijury.
The Bush Administration continued to assault The Act, but investigations 
continued, including one o f Bush Defense Secretary Caspar Weinburger. In addition, 
Lawrence Walsh continued what would be a  seven-year investigation o f the Iran-Contra 
Affair. The Act again expired at the end o f 1992, and it was in the hands of the newly- 
elected Clinton Administration. Although warned by the outgoing administration, the 
Clinton Administration believed in The Act and vowed to retain it. Shortly thereafter. 
Republicans called for an Independent Counsel to investigate Clinton for unethical
136
137
138
Stanley I. Kutler. “/« the Shadow o f  Watergate: Legal, Political, and Cultural 
Implications", 18 Nova L. Rev. 1743,1751 (1994).
Ibid.
Ibid., 1752.
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business dealings. Consequently, the Republicans, although they hated The Act, were in 
a quandary about reauthorization.'”  The Act prevailed, and was again reauthorized in 
1994.
It is a foregone conclusion that if  an administration is plagued by 
Independent Counsel investigations, it is not likely to support reauthorization o f The Act. 
However, opposing The Act is politically difficult, because it can make an administration 
look like it has something to hide. Consequently, the alternative to repealing The Act is 
to attack it, which has been the tactic of every administration since The Act’s inception. 
The attacks may not have caused the repeal o f The Act, but they have precipitated 
important changes to it, specifically in the following areas:
Name
The Independent Counsel became known as such with the 1983 
Amendments. Prior to 1983, he was known as the Special Prosecutor. In changing the 
name. Congress sought to remove the stigma associated with the name Special 
Prosecutor.'”
Standard for Preliminary Investigation and Request for Appointment
The amendments directed at the standards for preliminary investigation 
and request for appointment were the most important. The current standard for 
commencing a preliminary investigation requires the Attomey General to determine 
within 30 days of receiving “sufficient information” if there are grounds to investigate a 
covered official. In making the determination, she shall only consider 1 ) the specificity 
o f the information received and 2) the credibility o f the source.''" However, the Attomey
'”  Ibid.
'40 O’Keefe and Safirstein, 146.
28 USC §§ 591(d)(1) and (2).
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General cannot use the normal tools o f a prosecutor to do so: she cannot subpoena 
records, she cannot use a grand jury, and she cannot give witness immunity."’ The 
Amendments changed this inquiry in two ways.
First, prior to the 1994 Amendments to The Act, the Attomey General 
only had 15 days to determine whether a preliminary investigation should be commenced. 
The current standard gives the Attomey General 30 days, a  reasonable period of time to 
review the allegations presented. Second, the standard for instituting a preliminary 
investigation has been narrowed in scope. The original version o f the statute required the 
Attomey General to conduct a preliminary investigation when the Attomey General 
received “specific information” o f a violation of any federal criminal law, other than a 
petty offense. It did not define “specific information” and it did not give the Attomey 
General much discretion in determining whether the information was credible. Specific 
information could conceivably come from any source, as long as it was detailed. In 
addition to considering the specificity o f the information, the Attomey General may now 
also consider the credibility o f the source.
This change in The Act, made in 1983, was made in response to Attomey 
General Benjamin Civiletti’s request for Independent Counsels to investigate Carter 
Administration Official Hamilton Jordan and Campaign Manager Timothy Kraft. Jordan 
was accused of using cocaine in a discotheque in 1978, and Kraft was similarly accused 
of using drugs. The Attomey General had received reports of drug use from several 
people who were the subject o f  investigations by the Department o f Justice. After 
preliminary investigations, he was compelled to appoint Independent Counsels in both 
cases. Both were exonerated after investigation."*
Civiletti testified before the Senate that he would have neither commenced 
a preliminary investigation nor appointed Independent Counsels had he been following
142 Ibid., 1528. 11 USC § 591-592.
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standard Department o f Justice procedures rather than following the provisions o f The 
Act. Since he had specific information about alleged drug use, he was compelled to 
begin a preliminary investigation.'”  Whereas Attomey General Civiletti was not 
permitted to discount the credibility o f the sources, now the Attomey General may do so.
Similarly, the standard for requesting an Independent Counsel has 
changed. The original Act made the request mandatory unless the matter under 
investigation was “so unsubstantial” as to not warrant further investigation or 
prosecution. Civiletti testified that he could not classify the allegations against Jordan 
and Kraft as “so unsubstantial”, thus had to appoint Independent Counsels. The 1983 
Amendments changed the standard to “there are no reasonable grounds to believe” that 
further investigation or prosecution is warranted. It also added that the Attomey General 
shall, in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to warrant further investigation, 
comply with written or other established policies o f the Department o f Justice with 
respect to the enforcement o f criminal laws.
As a policy matter, the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of 
the Justice Department, the unit which reviews Independent Counsel requests, receives 
several dozens allegations every year. For example, from 1987 to 1992, over 50 requests 
were made. O f those requests, thirty-five preliminary inquiries were undertaken where it 
was determined that the evidence was not sufficiently specific or credible to warrant a 
preliminary investigation. In nine cases, there was specific and credible information as to 
a covered person, but it was determined that no referral was appropriate because no 
further investigation weis warranted. There were specific and credible allegations made as 
to eight people who were not covered by The Act, but who were associated with a 
covered person, such as a family member or a  close business associate. O f these eight
...(continued)
"* O’Keefe and Safirstein, 147, n.57.
144 O’Keefe and Safirstein, 137, fii. 52 and 135.
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allegations, initial inquires were undertaken and it was determined that they did not 
justify a referral. Lastly, in five cases during this period, there were applications for an 
Independent Counsel.”"*
It has been reported that Attomey General Janet Reno construes the 
language of The Act strictly, by gathering much more evidence than required to institute 
a preliminary investigation.'”  For example. Congressional Republicans requested that 
Reno appoint an Independent Counsel for campaign finance reform issues. To date, she 
has refused.'”  However, there is no shortage of Independent Counsels investigating the 
Clinton Administration. In May of 1998, Attomey General Reno decided to seek an 
Independent Counsel to investigate allegations against Labor Secretary Alexis Herman. 
Reno also appointed an Independent Counsel to investigate Interior Secretary Bruce 
Babbit for allegedly lying to Congress about his role in rejecting a proposed Indian 
casino. Other Clinton Administration officials who have been investigated by 
Independent Counsels include: Henry Cisneros, Mike Espy, Ron Brown, and Clinton 
himself.'”
Cost
The costs of Independent Counsel investigations have escalated, ranging 
from $3,300.00 to $47.4 million.'”  The 1994 Amendments added provisions regarding 
cost controls. None were present in the original statute. '*® These provisions require the 
Independent Counsel to conduct activities with due regard for expense, authorize only
145
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148
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Wilkinson and Ellis, 1528.
Tony Snow, Independent Counsel Statute Cuts Two Ways, The Detroit News, 
October 27, 1997, reprinted in http://www.detnews.com/voices/snow/971020.htm.
Spector, 1195-1197
Associated Press, List o f  Independent Counsel Probes, May 12, 1998, via 
http://www.CNN.com.
Wilkinson and Ellis, 1523.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
reasonable and lawful expenditures, and assign a person to certify that the expenditures 
are reasonable. Further, the Independent Counsel must comply with Department of 
Justice policies on expenditures unless inconsistent with purposes of The Act. Expenses 
are audited every six months. However, amendments also provided for travel expenses, 
per diem fees, and subsistence expenses, subject to certain limits. Anyone who wrongly 
certifies an expense is liable as other public officials are, but few if any limits are 
imposed on the funds expended in an investigation. The reports on expenditures are 
made public, but even public outcry does not compel the Independent Counsel to cut its 
expenditures. On this front, the Independent Counsel is left to his own discretion.
Length and Termination
An Independent Counsel serves until his prosecution is complete or he is 
removed from office. Prior to and including the 1983 Amendments, length o f office was 
not a concern to Congress, because the three counsels who had served had all completed 
their investigations in reasonable periods of time. Consequently, no changes were made 
regarding the length of the Independent Counsel’s service. In 1994, The Act was 
amended to require that if the Independent Counsel did not initiate termination himself 
(because all prosecutions were substantially completed), the Attomey General could 
initiate it or the Special Division, on its own motion, shall determine whether termination 
is appropriate. The Special Division must do so no later than two years after appointment, 
at the end of the next two year period, and at the end of every-one year period 
thereafter.
The Independent Counsel may be removed by impeachment and 
conviction, by the Attomey General for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any
...(continued)
28 USC § 594(1).
151 28 USC § 596.
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other condition that substantially impairs his performance. The good cause requirement 
was added by the 1983 Amendments. Prior to good cause, the standard was extraordinary 
impropriety. Extraordinary impropriety was not defined in The Act, but it was the same 
standard under which the Watergate Prosecutor was appointed.'*’ In establishing the 
good cause standard. Congress did not define good cause, but the Senate commented that 
the standard should be interpreted in accordance with existing case law on the removal of 
other officials who are subject to good cause removal. '** Neither did the Supreme Court 
define good cause in Morrison v Olson. While it is true that other government agencies 
have a good cause-type standard for removal, specifically the Federal Reserve, the 
Federal Trade Commission, and the former Interstate Commerce Commission,'*^ there is 
very little case law discussing what good cause means. The Federal Trade Commission 
standard specifies cause as inefficiency, neglect or malfeasance, which has been held In 
by the United States Supreme court to exclude removal on a whim.'** Consequently, 
some commentators'** believe it is possible to interpret the standard broadly to encompass 
a lot of conduct, but it has not yet been applied to any Independent Counsel.
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O’Keefe and Safirstein, 147, fh 47. According to O ’Keefe and Safirstein, 
Attomey General Richardson chose to resign rather than fire Cox, contrary to the 
instructions of president Nixon, because Cox’s actions did not meet the 
extraordinary impropriety standard.
Morrison v Olson, 2620, n. 33.
Swan V Clinton, 100 F3d 973 (DC Cir 1996).
See Humphrey’s Executor v US and Weiner v US, supra.
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 111. They attribute this argument in part to the Court’s 
reasoning in Bowsher v Synar, 478 U.S. 714,727 (1986), where the Court 
discussed the removal power o f Congress with regard to the Comptroller General. 
The statute said that the Comptroller General could be removed for inefficiency, 
abuse of office, neglect o f duty, or malfeasance, which is very similar to the FTC 
standard o f inefficiency, neglect or malfeasance. Congress called the removal 
power broad. If  the standard is analyzed the same way, then it would stand to 
reason that the Court may find that the good cause standard would allow removal 
o f the Independent Counsel for a wide range o f conduct.
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Reports
The Independent Counsel is required to file a yearly report with Congress. 
This requirement was added by the 1994 Amendments. The Act previously required the 
Counsel to file reports when appropriate. The length and scope of the investigations 
presumably led to this change, as the investigations began to span several years and cost 
millions. Congress needed to be periodically updated.'*’
In addition to yearly reports, the Independent Counsel must file a final 
report. Prior to 1994, the report had to discuss a description of work completed, 
including the disposition o f any cases bought, and the reasons for not prosecuting any 
matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the counsel. The 1994 Amendments 
removed the requirement o f discussing the reasons for non-prosecution. Once the report 
is filed, the attorneys for those investigated may obtain the portions of the report dealing 
with their clients. Any criticisms or responses the subject may have are attached to the 
report as an appendix and then it is released publicly. In certain circumstances, the 
report or portions o f it that are confidential will not be released.'** Some past 
Independent Counsels, such as Lawrence Walsh and Jacob Stein, believe the reporting 
requirement is necessary to justify expenditures and inform the public o f just what the 
Independent Counsel has accomplished.'*’ Others, such as Larry Thompson, who 
investigated the Department o f Housing and Urban Development, believe the report is 
time-consuming, expensive, and wasteful.
157
158
159
28 USC § 595.
Wilkinson and Ellis, 1544.
Wilkinson and Ellis, 1556. Walsh’s report exceeded four hundred pages and the 
appendix containing responses by those investigated was about one thousand 
pages.
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Reimbursement of Fees
The Act awards attorneys’ fees to those who are not indicted, a provision 
which was added by the 1983 Amendments.'*” The grant o f fees may have been a result 
o f the Jordan and Kraft investigations previously discussed, in which both incurred 
enormous attorneys’ fees. Jordan is said to have incurred over $100,000 in legal fees, 
more than twice his annual salary.'*' The 1994 Amendments qualified the award o f fees, 
by making the applicant address whether the cost would have been incurred but for the 
requirements of The Act. To recover fees, an applicant must show that ( 1 ) he is the 
subject o f the investigation, (2) fees were incurred during the investigation, (3) fees 
would not have been incurred but for the requirements o f The Act, and (4) fees are 
reasonable. '*~ The Special Division publishes all fee applications, and substantial 
amounts may be awarded. For example, the Special Division awarded Ronald Reagan 
$562,111.08 out of $777,651.79 requested for the Iran Contra Investigation, because 
Independent Counsel Walsh reported that he did not have proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President knew about the activities o f Oliver North.'*^ The Special 
Division, when awarding fees, generally excludes fees incurred in communicating with 
the media, because that is not a necessary expense incurred in defending a criminal 
prosecution.'*^
Persons Covered By The Act
Each round o f amendments brought changes to the scope o f persons 
covered by The Act. The President, Vice-President, Cabinet Officials, some deputy
160
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28 u s e  § 593(f).
O’Keefe and Safirstein, 147, fh 130.
In re North (Reagan Fee App.), 94 F3d 685 (DCCir 1996).
Ibid. See also In re Mullins, 84 F3d 459 (DC Cir 1996)(award of $223,186.66). 
Ibid.
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cabinet officials, the Director o f Central Intelligence, the 1RS Commissioner, and some 
national campaign officials have always been covered. The 1983 Amendments narrowed 
some of the executive officials to those within a  certain pay scale. However, at one point 
an amendment was proposed to extend coverage o f  The Act to the presidential spouse, 
children, and relatives. This was during the time that President Carter’s brother Billy was 
somehow involved with the government of Libya, commonly referred to as “Billygate”.'*’ 
The current statute also includes members o f Congress, but no Independent Counsels 
have yet been appointed to investigate a member o f  Congress. The current statute also 
limits the scope o f The Act to one year after leaving the covered position. Previously,
The Act had tied coverage to when the President left office.'** The policy arguments for 
restricting coverage of The Act continue and will be further addressed in a subsequent 
chapter.
The foregoing has discussed the policy changes made in response to the 
application of The Act. The application o f The Act in the last few years has generated 
additional arguments which will be discussed in Chapter 5. The next chapter discusses 
several “hot” legal issues which have arisen in the course of Independent Coimsel Starr’s 
investigation of the Clintons.
'*' Ibid., fii. 155.
'** 28 u s e  §591.
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HOT ISSUES
Independent Counsel Starr’s investigation o f the Whitewater land deal and 
related matters has raised several legal issues which have become front page news: the 
use o f executive privilege to keep advisors from answering relevant questions about the 
Monica Lewinsky investigation, the scope of governmental attorney-client privilege 
relating to the same investigation, the confidentiality attributed to the secret service- 
presidential relationship, and the scope o f the attomey-client privilege when the client is 
deceased. One final issue is raised by the resolution of all these privileges. If a sitting 
President is guilty o f violating the law, may he be prosecuted? In a legal sense, these are 
cutting edge issues which either push the boundaries of existing law or are destined to 
make new law. In a policy sense, these issues reflect normative considerations o f  the 
balance between the protection accorded our leaders and the information the public 
deserves. Aside from the theoretical questions, these privilege issues vividly 
demonstrate the defensive tactics o f an administration imder fire. Asserting a privilege is 
one o f the most effective ways to delay an Independent Counsel’s investigation because it 
takes time and resources to fight.
The Office o f the Independent Counsel is a legal entity. It pursues its 
investigation by using the legal process and it prosecutes it claims in the court system, 
using grand juries to indict its suspects. Under the United States Constitution, all those
43
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accused of crimes and all those being investigated are entitled to due process.'*^ This 
means that when subpoenaed, a party may object based on numerous grounds, privilege 
included, and is entitled to a hearing on his objections. Whether or not the objection is 
valid, the parties are required to file briefs and argue the merits o f the objection at a 
hearing. This may take anywhere from ten to thirty days, depending on the type of 
motion and the notice requirements. The lower court, generally a federal district court, 
issues a ruling, which may not be immediate, adding anywhere from one to one hundred 
twenty days to the process. If the administration loses a motion in the district court, it 
may move for reconsideration before appealing the ruling, which may add an additional 
ten to forty days to the process, to allow for briefing and argument. After the ruling on 
the motion for reconsideration, the administration may then file an appeal, if it is not 
happy with the ruling. The Independent Counsel may also file an appeal. In general, the 
parties have additional time to file a notice o f appeal, and a briefing schedule is then set 
by the court. The appellate process may take anywhere from thirty days to a year, 
although some proceedings may be expedited. After the circuit court rules, the parties 
may seek a hearing before the Supreme Court, which may hear the matter on a shortened 
timetable. In rare situations, the Supreme Court may dispense with appellate review 
altogether and hear a case straight from a district court. Consequently, all of these 
reviews cause significant delay, and these delays are to the benefit o f the persons being 
investigated.
Although many o f the complaints aimed at the Independent Counsel 
statute revolve around the time that the Independent Counsel spends investigating, and 
the expenses incurred during that investigation, the assertion o f privileges by those being 
investigated are a substantial factor in such time and expense. Although due process 
allows the President and those on his behalf to assert these privileges, one has to wonder
167 U.S. Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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what the effect would be if every assertion o f privilege was heard on an expedited basis.
If  justice were swift, would these investigations become more manageable, and 
consequently more reasonable?
This chapter examines the privileges discussed above, as well as the 
possibility of prosecuting a sitting President. Each of the privileges discussed has been 
recently asserted in the Whitewater investigation and its related matters. Executive 
privilege, the govemmental-attomey privilege, and the Secret Service “protective 
ftmction privilege” have been asserted in the Monica Lewinsky investigation. The extent 
o f the attomey-client privilege in the case o f a deceased client was raised in the 
investigation o f White House Counsel Vince Foster’s suicide. All o f these privilege 
issues have been or will be heard by the Supreme Court.
Executive Privilege
During Independent Counsel Starr’s investigation o f Monica Lewinsky, 
Starr sought to compel the testimony o f Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal before the 
grand jury. Bruce Lindsey is a deputy counsel with the White House and Sidney 
Blumenthal was a journalist who is currently an advisor to the President and Mrs.
Clinton. Miss Lewinsky and others are being investigated for suborning perjury, 
obstructing justice and/or intimidating witnesses concerning the Jones v Clinton sexual 
harassment case.'** Both Lindsey and Bliunenthal allegedly had information relating to 
whether federal crimes were committed by Lewinsky or others regarding the Jones v 
Clinton case.'*’ Specifically, the Independent Counsel wanted to know whether the
'** Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, sued President Clinton for sexual
harassment arising fi*om an incident which allegedly took place in a hotel room 
while he was Governor o f  Arkansas. The grant o f jurisdiction to the Independent 
Counsel specifies this as the scope o f the investigation. See In re Madison 
Guaranty Savings & Loan Assoc. (DC Cir Spec Div January 16, 1998).
'*’ Ms. Lewinsky filed an affidavit in the Jones case swearing that she never had
sexual relations with President Clinton. Contrary evidence came to the attention
...(continued)(continued...)
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President instructed Ms. Lewinsky to obstruct justice, if  he suborned perjury by knowing 
and encouraging her to file a false affidavit, or whether he discussed any instructions or 
suggestions he may have made to her with either Lindsey or Blumenthal. If he had, it 
would be highly relevant to the investigation.
Bruce Lindsey was called before the grand jury three times, on February 
18,28, and on March 12, 1998. At each session, he asserted executive privilege in 
response to several questions. He also asserted governmental attomey-client privilege. 
Sidney Blumenthal appeared before the grand jury on February 26, 1998 and asserted 
executive privilege on a number o f questions as well. He is not an attomey, thus the 
attomey-client privilege was not available to him.
Starr moved to compel the testimony of both men. In a detailed opinion, 
the District Court granted his motion. The White House appealed, and Starr applied to 
the Supreme Court for a writ to hear the issues immediately. In requesting the writ. Stan- 
argued that the matter contained a question o f overriding concern, namely “the 
circumstances under which the Executive Branch may withhold information from a 
federal grand jury investigating allegations o f misconduct against the President, other 
Executive Branch officials, and various private individuals.” The Supreme Court 
denied the application for an expedited hearing. The White House subsequently 
abandoned its claim of executive privilege as to both men, but retained its governmental
...(continued)
of the Independent Counsel, and allegations were made that the President told Ms. 
Lewinsky to lie, that he had friend and attomey Vemon Jordan take her to an 
attomey to file the false affidavit, and that he had Jordan secure her a job at 
Revlon Corporation in New York. Further allegations were made that Lewinsky 
instructed her friend Linda Tripp to lie under oath about the alleged affair.
Office o f the Independent Counsel, A Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the 
United States Court o f Appeals for the District o f Columbia Circuit, United States 
V Clinton, filed May 28, 1998, reprinted on http://www.washingtonpost.com.
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attomey-client privilege claim as to Lindsey. An appeals court has agreed to hear the 
Lindsey case at the end of June, 1998.'”
The guiding case on executive privilege is United States v Nixon.'^' In 
Nixon, the Supreme Court addressed whether President Nixon could assert executive 
privilege as to certain recorded conversations and documents relating to conversations 
between himself and his advisors regarding the Watergate break-in. Balancing the need 
for confidentiality among those in decision-making capacities and the need for 
information relevant to a grand jury investigation, the Court acknowledged that there has 
always been an understanding that some communications between high government 
officials should be confidential. “Human experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination o f their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances 
and for their own interests to the detriment o f the decision-making process.” '” As an 
example, the Court cited the meetings o f the Constitutional Convention in 1787, which 
were conducted in complete privacy. The notes o f the meetings were kept confidential 
for 30 years.'”  However, the need for evidence in a pending grand jury investigation is 
equally, sometimes more important that the President’s need for confidentiality.
Nixon argued that his privilege was and should be absolute, based on both 
the need for confidentiality in Executive Branch decision-making and the independence 
o f the Executive Branch under the Constitution.'”  The Court concluded that the 
President was entitled to the privilege, but not the absolute privilege Nixon sought. If the 
asserted privilege was based on military or diplomatic secrets, the Court would grant the 
utmost deference to the President, as it has done in the past. But in Nixon, the President
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asserted only a general interest in confidentiality. This alone would not suffice to render 
a  communication privileged. However, if the asserted general interest in confidentiality 
related to the effective discharge o f the President’s powers, it would be constitutionally 
based, but it would need to be weighed with the effect it has on the fair administration of 
criminal justice.'”  In Nixon’s case, his generalized interest in confidentiality did not 
prevail over the fimdamental demands of due process o f law in the fair administration of 
criminal justice. Thus, the Court held that “[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must 
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” '”  
Procedurally, the holding in United States v Nixon instituted a test: when a President 
invokes executive privilege, the court must treat the subpoenaed material as 
presumptively privileged and require the Special Prosecutor to show that the material is 
essential to the justice o f the pending criminal case.'”
The District Court in the Lewinsky case followed the dictates of the 
Supreme Court and treated Lindsey and Blumenthal’s '”  testimony as presumptively 
privileged.'*" The District Court then analyzed the interest the President sought to 
protect. Although purely personal conversations that did not touch on the President’s 
constitutional duties or on policy decisions would not be covered by the privilege, many 
private matters are discussed in the context o f official policymaking, and those 
conversations would be covered. For example, the President’s discussions o f the 
Lewinsky matter and how it would be handled when British Prime Minister Tony Blair
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visited the United States would be privileged.'*' The District Court could not classify the 
conversations as purely personal, non-privileged communications, because it had sworn 
statements from the White House that the conversations involved official matters such as 
possible impeachment proceedings, foreign and domestic policy matters, and the 
assertion of official privileges.'*^ Unlike Nixon, where documents were involved and the 
Court could examine the documents in camera to determine their content, the subject of 
the Lewinsky motions was testimony. As such, the District Court had to treat the 
testimony as presumptively privileged, requiring the Independent Counsel to make a 
showing of need.
In order to show need, the Independent Counsel must show: I ) that each discrete 
group o f the subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence; and 2) that this 
evidence is not available with due diligence elsewhere. '*̂  The District Court determined 
that Starr had made such a showing, based in an in camera review of the evidence 
gathered so far. The opinion does not detail the findings made by the District Court 
discussing Starr’s showing of need, due to the confidentiality of grand jury 
proceedings.'*^ The District Court did comment, however, that if  there were instructions 
to obstruct justice or efforts to suborn perjury, they would likely take the form of 
conversations with close advisors, and may constitute some of the most relevant evidence 
in the investigation, whether exculpatory or inculpatory.'*’ Consequently, the motion 
was granted.
The Lewinsky case seems an appropriate case in which to deny the use of 
executive privilege. From the allegations made thus far, it stems from the personal
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conduct of the President, and his subsequent efforts to deal with his conduct. It would 
not be difficult for the Independent Counsel to show need in such a situation. However, 
the interesting questions begin when the investigation revolves around national security 
or military issues. For example, both the Senate and the House are investigating dealings 
between the Clinton Administration and the Chinese government which resulted in 
assisting the Chinese in perfecting rocket launchers for nuclear weapons, and allowing 
launches o f U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets.'** If an Independent Counsel is appointed, 
surely his efforts to compel testimony on certain issues will invoke claims of executive 
privilege. Under Nixon, such claims may be successful.
Governmental Attomey-Client Privilege
In addition to asserting executive privilege, Bruce Lindsey asserted 
governmental attomey-client privilege. The attomey-client privilege protects 
communications between attorneys and their clients that are intended to be confidential 
and are made for the purpose o f obtaining legal advice.'*’ As Deputy Counsel to the 
Office o f the President, Lindsey claimed that he advised the President on how to keep 
pending litigation from affecting his constitutional duties, whether or not to assert 
privileges, and advised him with respect to potential impeachment proceedings. If 
Lindsey had been Clinton’s private attomey, this information would unquestionably be 
privileged. However, Lindsey is paid by the government, and there is an argument that 
government attorneys work for the public, thus officials for whom they work should not 
be able to claim the privilege to conceal information from the public.
Only one Court of Appeal has explicitly held that a governmental 
attomey-client privilege exists. However, it may not be asserted in grand jury
'** Walter F incus and John Mintz, White House: Chinese Launches Aid U.S..
Washington Post, Jtme 19, 1998, A04.
'*’ Tax Analysts v 1RS, 111 F3d 607,618 (DC Cir 1997).
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proceedings. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, '** the Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals 
addressed the private conduct o f President and Mrs. Clinton in the Whitewater matter.
The Independent Counsel had subpoenaed all documents created by government 
attorneys related to the Whitewater matter, and the White House refused to produce some 
of its notes which were responsive to the subpoena, asserting a governmental attomey- 
client privilege.'*’ The notes were taken during meetings between Mrs. Clinton, White 
House attorneys, and her personal attomeys.'”  The court ruled that while such a 
privilege may exist in other circumstances, no privilege exists in a federal criminal 
investigation.
The District Court in Lindsey’s case did not follow the reasoning of the 
Eighth Circuit and held that a governmental attomey-client privilege does apply in the 
federal grand jury context. However, the privilege is not absolute in criminal cases, as it 
is in civil cases. The court held that “in the context of a federal grand jury investigation 
where one government agency needs information from another to determine if a crime 
has been committed, the court finds that the governmental attomey-client privilege must 
be qualified in order to balance the needs o f the criminal justice system against the 
government agency’s need for confidential legal advice.'”  The court compared the 
attomey-client privilege to the executive privilege and concluded that the standard should 
be the same. Absent such consistency, the President’s legal advisors will simply 
recharacterize their legal advice as political advice in order to be evaluated under the 
more lenient standard governing executive privilege. Consequently, for the same reasons 
the court granted the Independent Counsel’s motion to compel based on executive
'** 112 F3d 910 (8** Cir 1997).
'*’ Ibid., 914.
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privilege, it granted the Independent Counsel's motion based on the governmental 
attomey-client privilege.
While abandoning its executive privilege claim, the White House is 
pursuing its governmental attomey-client privilege claim. It seeks to overtum the holding 
that the privilege is qualified, as the executive privilege, and establish the standard as 
absolute in all contexts, including before a  grand jury.
Attorney Client Privilege After Death
In another controversial move. Independent Counsel Starr brought a 
motion before the court to compel disclosure o f three pages o f notes taken by Vince 
Foster’s attomey while on the phone with Foster nine days before he committed suicide. 
Starr believes the notes may assist in the investigation o f the White House travel office.'”  
Foster’s lawyer refused to tum over the notes, and asserted the attomey-client privilege 
on behalf o f his deceased client. The District Court ruled that the notes were privileged, a 
ruling which was overtumed by the District o f Columbia Court of Appeals. The Supreme 
Court overtumed the D C. Circuit, holding that the privilege remained intact.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Foster’s attomey argued that 
the privilege should survive the client’s death, because to end the privilege at death would 
chill discussion between a lawyer and client, especially a client who may be sick or close 
to death. If  a client knows that his communications with an attomey may be disclosed 
after his death, he may not be honest with the attomey. Honesty is important in an 
attomey-client relationship and confidentiality is what encourages that honesty and builds 
a relationship o f trust. The attomey-client privilege exists in part to assure the client that 
the attomey has his best interests in mind and will protect those interests. If the client 
fears disclosure, he will not speak freely to the attomey. Starr’s office argued that their
'”  Deborah Zabarenko, High Court Hears Foster Lawyer-privilege Case, Reuters, 
June 9,1998, via http://www.infoseek.com.
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need to review the notes outweighed any attomey-deceased-ciient privilege. The only 
way to get to certain information would be by relaxing the privilege. Once a person dies, 
there is no means for questioning him or her about the underlying events, which is a 
subject the privilege does not protect.
The Supreme Court, in a six to three opinion, held that the privilege 
remained intact. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. The Majority 
reasoned that the majority o f cases addressing the privilege held or assumed that the 
privilege remained intact after death. Although it may be waived in some testamentary 
cases, the privilege is still presumed to exist. In the Foster case, the Court held, the 
Independent Counsel did not show that the rule should be overtumed. Further, the 
purpose behind the privilege weighed against disclosure to the Independent Counsel.'”  
Consequently, Starr will not have access to Foster’s attomey’s notes.
The Dissent argued that exceptions to the privilege should be made when 
there is a compelling law enforcement need for the information, and suggested that when 
the privilege is asserted in the criminal context, and a showing is made that the 
communications at issue contain necessary factual information not otherwise available, a 
court should be permitted to determine whether the privilege should be forgone.'”
Protective Function Privilege
In the Monica Lewinsky investigation. Independent Counsel Starr seeks 
the testimony o f several Secret Service agents who staff the President’s detail. The 
Secret Service has instructed the involved agents not to answer certain questions, based 
on what it calls the “protective function privilege.” Although no such privilege currently
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exists, the Secret Service is attempting to establish it.'”  The Secret Service argues that 
the proposed privilege should cover; 1 ) observations o f conduct, 2) overheard statements, 
and 3) observations o f individuals made by Secret Service employees while performing a 
protective function in proximity to the President. It would also extend to hearsay 
communications of privileged information, meaning actions or statements not personally 
witnessed by the agent, but communicated to the agent by another person. The proposed 
privilege would not need to be invoked by the President, but by the Secretary o f the 
Treasury.'”  The privilege would be absolute, with two exceptions: the first for 
compelling circumstances, such as overriding national security concems, and the second, 
where an officer or agent observes conduct or hears statements that are, at the time, 
sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to conclude that a felony has been, is being, or 
will be committed.'”
The reasoning behind this proposed privilege is that Secret Service agents 
must be able to be close to the President at all times in order to protect him. If a President 
believes his actions and conversations will not be protected, then he is likely to push the 
agents away, creating substantial risk. Because the Secret Service uses a “cover and 
evacuate” strategy rather than a “counter-offensive” strategy, the proposed privilege 
becomes a matter of life and death. The “cover and evacuate” strategy means that the
'”  This is a case o f first impression. No party has cited any previous occasions when 
Secret Service agents have been compelled to testify in front of a grand jury as to 
potential crimind conduct they may have witnessed while in close proximity to 
the President. However, Secret Service agents have testified injudicial and non- 
judicial proceedings with respect to President Nixon’s taping system and John 
Hinkley’s attempted assassination o f President Reagan. No protective function 
privilege was asserted in those proceedings. Order, US v Robert Rubin, In re 
Grand Jury Proceeding, entered May 22, 1998, reprinted at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com. 3-4.
Office of the Independent Counsel, Petition for a Writ o f Certiorari before United 
States Supreme Court, US v Robert Rubin, In re Grand Jury Proceeding, DDC 
Mise No 98-148 (NHJ), filed June 2, 1998, reprinted at 
http://www.washingtonnost.com, 4.
Ibid.
196
197
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
Secret Service protects the President by forming an all-encompassing zone o f protection 
on a twenty-four hour, three hundred and sixty-five days a year basis.” * It responds to an 
attack by protecting and evacuating the President from the area, rather than shooting back 
at the offender. For this reason, the lack of close proximity could mean death.
Secret Service Director Merletti, in a declaration filed with the District 
Court, stated the historical bases for the Secret Service’s position that close proximity is a 
matter of life and death. In both the McKinley and Kennedy Assassinations, the Secret 
Service believes that it could have saved the President by being only a few feet closer. 
President McKinley was assassinated in 1901, at the Pan-American Exposition. A Secret 
Service agent was supposed to be positioned directly next to McKinley in the public 
receiving line. At the request of the president o f the Pan-American Exposition, he was 
positioned next to the President and the Secret Service agent was moved. Shortly after, 
the President was shot at very close range, by a man who had a gun wrapped in a 
handkerchief. The Secret Service believes it may have been able to save the President 
had it been in closer proximity.”’ Similar circumstances existed with the Kennedy 
Assassination. Usually, Secret Service agents would be positioned on the running board 
of the President’s limousine while it was traveling. At the instruction of the President, 
the agents were ordered off o f the running boards on the fateful day o f his assassination. 
The Secret Service believes it may have been able to prevent the assassination.™ In 
contrast, when John Hinkley Jr. tried to assassinate President Reagan, agents were able to 
immediately shield the President’s body and evacuate him from the situation.” '
According to Merletti, these examples show the importance of close proximity to the 
President and the necessity for a President’s trust in the ability and discretion o f the
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agents on his detail. This trust would be compromised i f  an agent were compelled to 
testify about what he saw and heard while protecting the President. As additional support 
for its position, the Secret Service offered a letter written by Former President George 
Bush, in which he supported their position that a President would be uncomfortable 
having the agents nearby if the agents were forced to testify about what they might have 
seen or heard. The potential for such testimony may damage the confidence the President 
has in the discretion of the Secret service.™
The District Court granted Starr’s Motion to Compel, denying the claim of 
protective function privilege and refusing to establish such a privilege. In evaluating 
whether a new privilege should be established, a court must consider: 1 ) whether the 
asserted privilege is historically rooted in federal law; 2) whether any states have 
recognized the privilege; and 3) public policy interests.’"  In this case, there is no history 
of such a privilege, no state has recognized such a privilege, and the public policy interest 
in such a privilege is not compelling.
The protective function privilege is not historically rooted in federal law.
In fact, no federal court has ever recognized such a privilege. Neither did Congress when 
it enacted the statute which requires that the President and Vice President accept the 
protection o f the Secret Service.™ To the contrary, the District Court reasoned. Congress 
imposed a duty on all executive branch personnel to report criminal activity by 
government officers and employees to the Attomey General, unless the Attomey General 
directs otherwise.” ’
...(continued)
™ Ib id .,1 12.
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Nor has any state ever recognized a protective function privilege. The 
District Court considered this an important factor, stating “[t]he fact that every state has a 
governor in need of protection and that no state has ever recognized a protective function 
privilege provides a compelling reason for not creating the new privilege.”’”
Lastly, the District Court considered the public policy issues, which the Secret 
Service argued extensively. While acknowledging that the President’s safety is of 
paramount national importance, the court did not accept the argument that the President 
would be placed in greater peril if the Secret Service agents protecting him were able to 
testify about what they saw and heard. “When people act within the law, they do not 
ordinarily push away those they trust or rely upon for fear that their actions will be 
reported to a grand jury.”’”  The court cites instances when Secret Service agents have 
written books and granted interviews o f their experiences, and says that there is no 
indication that these instances have caused Presidents to push their protectors away.’"* 
Furthermore, a Secret Service agent has a legal duty both as a government employee 
under §535(b) and as a law enforcement officer to report criminal activity. Thus, the 
policy arguments do not justify establishing such a privilege.
The White House appealed the District Court’s Order, and the Independent 
Counsel applied for expedited hearing from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
denied the expedited hearing.
May a Sitting President be Prosecuted?
The investigation into Whitewater and the related Lewinsky matter raise 
an important question: If the Independent Counsel finds that the President has committed 
a crime, may he prosecute the President for that crime? The answer may be “no”. The
’"* Order, 5-6.
’"’ Order, 6-7.
208 Order, 7.
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Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office on impeachment 
for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.™ 
However, it says nothing about prosecuting a sitting president without bringing articles of 
impeachment against him. Similarly, the Ethics in Government Act provides that the 
Independent Counsel may send a report to Congress containing all evidence that 
constitutes grounds for impeachment,’”  but does not provide that the President may be 
prosecuted for crimes absent impeachment. The Justice Department and others have 
opined that impeachment is the only proceeding available to remove a President, both 
because the Constitution provides that remedy and because the President has a “unique 
role at the head of the executive branch.”’"
However, a President may be civilly sued for private conduct. Public 
officials generally have immunity from suit for money damages arising out of their 
official acts. It is supposed to enable certain officials to perform their jobs effectively 
without worrying about personal liability arising from one of their decisions. The 
President has such immunity with regard to his official acts.’” But he does not have the 
same immunity for unofficial acts.’” The immunity depends on the function performed, 
not the identity o f the person who performed it.’” In Clinton v Jones, t h e  Supreme 
Court held 1 ) that the President is not granted temporary immunity from civil damages
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litigation arising out o f events that occurred before he took office, and 2) it is not 
necessary to stay the trial o f the action until the President is out of office.’”
Consequently, while the Independent Counsel may not prosecute the President until he 
has been impeached and convicted by Congress, the government may possibly take civil 
action against him for actions which are unofficial. The distinction between official and 
unofficial while the President is in office is blurry, and legal battles are inevitable.
Further, the political consequences would prevent any such lawsuit and it is unclear who 
could actually institute such an action. Thus, impeachment appears to be the only real 
remedy available for a President who violates the law.
As shown by the discussion above, Starr’s investigation of the Whitewater 
affair and related matters has raised several controversial legal issues. The Clinton 
Administration is taking full advantage o f the challenges these issues present, which 
lengthens the investigation(s) considerably. If the only remedy against the President is 
impeachment, then time is on his side. Given the time these challenges are taking, and 
the additional time it would take for Congress to evaluate any report and institute 
impeachment proceedings, this President will likely be out of office. However, he could 
be prosecuted for these crimes when out of office, unless pardoned by the next President. 
In any case, if  the President’s goal is to keep his Presidency intact until the next election, 
he has a good chance o f success.
216 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
The foregoing Chapters have discussed the law which created the 
Independent Counsel, its history, its constitutionality, policy changes throughout the 
years, and the current issues which are making headlines. This Chapter seeks to analyze 
The Act in terms o f its application. What problems arise during implementation and what 
can Congress do to solve those problems? The press is full of criticism about the current 
Independent Counsel investigation o f the Whitewater and Lewinsky matters, but much of 
that is simply politics. However, there have been many real criticisms of the provisions 
of The Act which deserve discussion. The criticisms discussed here are divided into two 
categories: statutory and overall. The statutory criticisms address problems that 
Congress can either solve or improve upon by amending The Act. The second category 
of criticisms address the overall value of the statute, many of which call for its repeal. 
Finally, this Chapter will propose and discuss several solutions to the problems raised and 
discuss whether The Act should and will be reauthorized.
Statutory Criticisms
There are six main criticisms o f The Act, which are categorized in the 
following maimer: appointment o f the counsel, scope of the investigation, time spent on 
the investigation, cost o f the investigation, removal o f the counsel, and concurrent 
Congressional investigations.
60
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Appointment
The main criticism directed at the appointment of the Independent Counsel 
is that the standard is too easy to meet. As discussed earlier, in order to commence a 
preliminary investigation, the Attomey General needs specific and credible information 
that a covered official has committed a federal crime. Once the preliminary investigation 
is over, imless the Attomey General determines that no further investigation is warranted, 
she must appoint an Independent Counsel. But she is handicapped by her inability to use 
the normal tools of a prosecutor, such as the subpoena power. The ease with which a 
counsel may be appointed has created too many investigations, the most recent example 
being the appointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate Labor Secretary Alexis 
Herman. Secretary Herman is alleged to have received commissions
on the value o f work she assisted a certain businessman in obtaining, by using her 
connections as a White House Official. The businessman, Laurent J. Yene, claims that he 
agreed to pay her a 10% commission on any profits his company made with her 
assistance during the period 1995 through 1996. The Justice Department, after initial 
investigation, believes that Yene’s company made about $45,000 from this business, 
which would have entitled Herman to $4,500.’” Despite the small amount o f alleged 
gains, the Attomey General was forced to request an Independent Counsel. In Reno's 
request to the Special Division, she discussed the efforts made to investigate the 
allegations, which included reviewing many documents and conducting over one hundred 
interviews. The investigation uncovered some financial transactions which may have 
corroborated Yéné’s testimony. Consequently, Reno concluded she had reasonable 
grounds to believe further investigation was warranted. However, she stated in the 
request “[a]Ithough our investigation has developed no evidence clearly demonstrating
Attomey General Janet Reno, Application to the Court Pursuant to 28 USC 
§592(C)(1) fo r  the Appointment o f  an Independent Counsel May 21, 1998, 
reprinted at http://www.courttv.com/librarv/govemment/herman.html.
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Secretary Herman’s involvement in these matters, and substantial evidence suggesting 
that she may not have been Involved, a great deal of Yene’s story has been corroborated; 
we thus are unable to conclude that he is not credible. This, coupled with the strictures 
and limited investigative tools available under The Act, have led me to conclude that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted, in order to 
determine whether Secretary Herman violated any federal criminal law other than a Class 
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.”” * Although Reno had no conclusive evidence that 
Herman was involved in illegal activities, she still had to request the appointment of an 
Independent Counsel. This criticism is further reinforced by the appointment o f six other 
Independent Counsels since August o f 1994.” ’
Scope o f Investigation 
Many criticisms are directed at the scope of the counsel’s investigation, in 
terms of power, subjects, and crimes. The Independent Counsel has unlimited power, 
which is focused on one cause. He has the resources and authority of the Attomey 
General, yet only himself to impose limits. Former Independent Counsel Jacob Stein, 
now attomey for Monica Lewinsky, is quoted as saying, “1 was astonished at the 
authority I had, and I felt it was a personal test o f my own sanity in the exercise of that 
authority. I don’t know whether others thought that I passed the test. But I had more 
authority than anybody should have.””" Some former Independent Counsels believe that 
if you put too many checks on the Independent Counsel, he will not be truly
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independent.” ' Others, including Lawrence Walsh, claim there are already at least two 
checks on the Independent Counsel; the Special Division’s grant o f jurisdiction and the 
Attorney General’s power to remove the Independent Counsel for cause.’”  Although the 
first check is often been challenged by defense counsel, the second has yet to be 
exercised.
In addition to unlimited power during the investigation, the Independent 
Counsel appears to be able to investigate almost anyone. His authority is not limited to 
those who are named in his grant o f jurisdiction, nor those who are covered officials 
under The Act. Without considering the referral jurisdiction. The Act already covers too 
many officials. The history of The Act indicates that it is concerned with the very highest 
level o f government officials. The Act’s provision allowing for referral of related matters 
then allows the Independent Counsel to bring people into the investigation who may not 
even be government officials and who have absolutely no connection with the original 
crime being investigated. For example, the Monica Lewinsky investigation was deemed 
a related matter to the Jones v Clinton case, which was a related matter to the Whitewater 
investigation. They are all connected by the Clinton Administration’s alleged efforts to 
encourage wimesses to lie. However. Monica Lewinsky is not one of the officials 
covered by The Act, nor should she be. She has no relationship to the Whitewater land 
deals, yet now she is the subject of a  grand jury investigation where she may be indicted 
and tried for covering up an alleged affair with the President. The scope of those who are 
subject to investigation is virtually limitless.
The last criticism directed at the scope o f The Act is that it covers too 
many crimes. Currently, one can be investigated for any federal crime which is not a 
Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. However, the genesis o f the statute was the
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firing of a special prosecutor who was investigating the President’s involvement in the 
burglary o f the Democratic National Headquarters, and its subsequent cover-up. The 
Watergate break-in was a textbook example o f a President abusing his power as 
President, and using his office to engage in criminal activity. The crimes currently being 
investigated do not reach that level of criminality. Rather, they are often political 
questions which become criminalized. If the President had intimate relations with a 
White House intern, is that a criminal matter or a political matter? The fact that he may 
have encouraged her to lie may make it a criminal matter, but it is arguably not a proper 
line o f inquiry for an Independent Counsel. Is Labor Secretary Herman’s alleged profit o f 
$4,500 enough to justify an investigation that may cost millions? What about the 
investigation o f Hamilton Jordan for alleged drug use? Some o f these investigations may 
be better left to the Justice Department, while others may be better left to the press and 
the President’s political opponents. The country’s resources should be spent 
investigating the truly serious crimes.
Time Spent
As discussed. Independent Counsel investigations can take years to 
complete, and most do. Several of the current investigations have been ongoing since 
1994 and 1995, namely the investigations of Mike Espy, the Clintons, and Henry 
Cisneros. Lawrence Walsh’s investigation spanned seven years. The Act does not limit 
the time spent investigating, although the Special Division is required to review whether 
the counsel’s investigation should be terminated after 2 years, and then every year 
thereafter. This is not a limit on time, because, as previously mentioned, the investigation 
can only be terminated when all prosecutions are substantially completed. If the 
investigation is still ongoing, the Special Division does not have the power to terminate 
it.
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In response to such criticism, former Independent Counsel Larry 
Thompson claims that limiting a counsel’s investigation is an unrealistic proposal 
because the counsel is investigating criminal activity, which generally includes cover-ups 
o f relevant information, and possibly obstruction o f justice.™ Lawrence Walsh agrees, 
noting that the Independent Counsel is pitted against some o f the best defense counsel in 
the country, many of which are well-versed in diversionary tactics. In some cases, Walsh 
comments, the Independent Counsel is up against those in government who are well- 
trained at hiding information. For example, in the Iran-Contra investigation, Walsh was 
up against the CIA, who are known to produce a hundred thousand documents and hold 
back the ten that explain the hundred thousand.’”  However, the time engulfed by these 
investigations damages those involved, and at some point will exceed the public interest 
in the investigation altogether.
Cost o f Investigation 
With Lawrence Walsh’s investigation topping forty-seven million dollars 
and most costing somewhere in the millions, the cost o f investigations is frequently 
criticized. Although the counsel is subject to audits and a member of his staff must 
certify all expenditures made, the supposed controls do not seem to make a difference.
The public hears only about the millions o f dollars being spent during the investigations, 
and has no choice but to believe it is a waste o f money. There is very little effort to 
explain to the public why it costs so much to investigate, nor are the audit results 
publicized to provide more information. When millions are spent and the evidence 
gathered is withheld, criticism is inevitable.
Ibid., 1550. 
Ibid.
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Removal o f  the Counsel 
Many believe that the Attorney General’s power to remove the 
Independent Counsel for cause is illusory. Politically, it is untenable, because any action 
the Attorney General takes towards removing the counsel will be attributed to the 
administration being investigated and seen as an attempt to obstruct justice. Legally, the 
Attorney General has no precedent to guide her in determining good cause. Is good cause 
leaking information learned in a grand jury proceeding to the press, as some have alleged 
of Independent Counsel Starr? Perhaps, but it may require yet another investigation to 
determine if good cause exists. Consequently, the Attorney General’s power to remove 
the counsel for good cause is no power at all.
Concurrent Congressional Investigations 
Congress has the power to conduct its own investigations and has been 
doing so for over two hundred years. Since 1792, Congress has been investigating 
matters of public interest, such as the failed Sinclair expedition, where American Soldiers 
were killed by Native Americans in the Northwest Territory,"’ the Teapot Dome Scandal, 
Watergate, Iran Contra, and Whitewater, and most recently illegal campaign 
contributions. Sometimes, Congress investigates the same matter as an Independent 
Counsel. Concurrent investigations mainly cause problems for the Independent Counsel, 
and The Act does not address this situation. For example, Lawrence Walsh’s 
investigation o f Iran Contra overlapped with Congress’ hearings on Iran Contra and it 
was Walsh’s investigation that suffered. Although the Congressional attorneys handling 
the House and Senate investigations tried to cooperate with Walsh, their objectives 
differed and problems arose with witnesses and documents. The biggest problem Walsh 
had was Congress’ grant o f immunity to many o f those involved in the arms for hostages
225 Wilkinson and Ellis, 1566.
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transactions. Once Congress grants immunity, it is difficult for the Independent Counsel 
to secure a conviction, because the information the immunized party gives cannot be used 
against him, absent certain exceptions. Congress’ grant o f immunity to those involved in 
the Iran Contra affair really damaged Walsh’s investigation and led to the overturning o f 
several convictions. Although this problem may not seem as crucial as some of the 
others mentioned, it rendered much o f the time and resources spent on the Iran Contra 
investigation useless.
Overall Criticisms
The Act as a whole is criticized for creating a monster -  an investigator 
with unlimited power, no checks and balances, focused in on one target. The question is 
not whether he will hit this target, but when and who will he bring down with his target.
It is, many claim, a witch hunt. Former Independent Counsel Jacob Stein put it this way: 
"‘Whatever the starting point, the matter in hand spreads out and out, encompassing ever 
vaster horizons, and if  it were permitted to go further and further in every direction, it 
would end by embracing the entire universe.”"*
In addition to ever-expanding, the “witch hunt” becomes partisan. The 
Act is used by the political party which is not in the White House to attack the party 
which is. Justice Scalia made reference to this in his dissent in Morrison v Olson. 
Further, the party that is being investigated inevitably accuses the other of conspiring 
with the Independent Counsel, implicating the counsel, the Special Division, members of 
Congress, and our judicial system. Lawyers for the accused fuel the fire, even attacking 
the counsel personally, as if  he were running for a hotly contested political office.
Finally, the investigation attracts an undue amount of attention from the 
media. Allegations of high-level officials engaging in criminal conduct, especially when
226 Quoting Italvo Calvino, Six Memos fo r  the Next Millenium (Craugh: 1988), 107.
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it relates to sexual misconduct, are front-page stories. For example, for the past seven 
months, the airwaves have been bombarded with stories about the Lewinsky matter. 
Inevitably, the matter grows in stature while other foreign and domestic policy matters 
suffer.
These overall criticisms lead to the observation that we would be better 
served by repealing The Act and allowing the Attorney General to appoint special 
prosecutors, as was the case before The Act. Consequently, critics argue, if  the President 
wanted to remove a prosecutor, he would be deterred by fear o f public reproval or 
impeachment, but would not be limited by statute."’
Statutory Solutions
Appointment and Removal 
In order to solve the problems associated with appointing and removing 
the Independent Counsel, the Attorney General must be given more discretion. In 
particular, when the Attorney General evaluates a request for an Independent Counsel, 
she should be allowed to weigh the seriousness o f the alleged crime and the cost involved 
in conducting an independent investigation. Although some would argue that the current 
restrictions ensure that the Attorney General will not exert undue influence on the 
investigation, we have seen that such minimal discretion leads to unnecessary 
investigations. In addition, the standard for requesting appointment after the preliminary 
investigation has been conducted should be raised. The current standard o f “reasonable 
grounds to believe further investigation is warranted” should be raised to something akin 
to a “probable cause to believe a crime was committed” standard. In investigating the 
allegations, the Attorney General should be permitted to use subpoenas to compel
227 Theodore Olson, Terry Eastland, and Archibald Cox support this view.
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testimony and documents. Consequently, if an Independent Counsel is appointed, it will 
be for good cause.
In addition to raising the appointment standard, the removal standard 
should be defined. The removal provisions in The Act should be amended to specify 
what good cause means. Suggestions include: violating the Rules o f Professional 
Conduct, abusing prosecutorial power, making false statements, and exceeding specified 
time limits. These types of limits would make the counsel more accountable and give the 
Attomey General a standard to rely on so that a counsel who abuses his power may be 
reigned in.
Scope
The scope o f The Act should be restricted to fewer officials and far fewer 
crimes. One suggestion is to limit the coverage of The Act to the President, Vice 
President, Cabinet Officials, and Campaign Officials. Lower-level Executive Branch 
officials and members of Congress do not need to be included in The Act. There are 
others who can and have investigated them with success.
The crimes within the scope of The Act should be narrowed to very 
serious ones, such as those which relate to the functioning of the office and the power 
vested in it. An abuse of power or misuse o f office for financial or political gain are 
examples of crimes which should be covered. Failed land deals, casual drug use, or 
sexual antics are not crimes which an Independent Counsel should investigate.
Time Limits
In response to criticisms about the length of investigations, either the term 
of the Independent Counsel should be limited to two years or 30 months, at most, or a 
full-time Independent Counsel should be appointed to handle all investigations. The 
former Independent Counsels who have suggested self-imposed time limits may think
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
that these suggested limits are arbitrary, but at some point an investigation loses its value. 
Walsh’s investigation outlasted the administration he was investigating. A full-time 
counsel would impose similar limits on the person inhabiting that office as a normal 
prosecutor faces— limited time, resources, and several ongoing investigations. This 
proposed solution may provide the counsel with some perspective, which would diminish 
the “witch-hunt” quality of current investigations.
Cost
In addition to imposing a time limit, imposing real cost controls would 
improve the image of the investigation and provide a more efficient means to implement 
The Act. If the counsel had a budget, he would have to make the same prosecutorial 
decisions as other prosecutors, specifically who to pursue with the resources available. 
The counsel could not then spin an endless web because he would not have the funds to 
do so.
Concurrent Congressional Investigation
The only real solution to the Congressional investigation problem is to 
limit Independent Counsel investigations when a Congressional investigation is ongoing, 
or force Congress to consult the Independent Counsel before granting immunity to 
witnesses. The Independent Counsel should not be appointed in situations where a 
Congressional inquiry will serve a greater good, such as in the campaign contribution 
matter, where a large number o f people may have made illegal contributions and the 
inquiry reveals a whole system of wrongdoing, rather than one or two high-level officials 
who have broken the law.
In sum, these proposed statutory solutions will tailor The Act to what its 
original purpose was, namely to appoint an independent person to investigate the few 
matters that the Justice Department cannot.
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Overall Solutions
In response to the overall criticisms of The Act, making the proposed 
statutory solutions would change the perception of it. The Independent Counsel would 
only be appointed when very high-level officials have committed a serious crime which 
implicates the office as well as the person. Investigations would be limited and more 
efficient and the public would be better informed. The Office of the Independent Counsel 
would come to be known as a serious office designed to enforce the maxim that no man 
or woman is above the law.
Part o f the overall solution is for the counsel to inform the public o f how 
The Act works, what he is spending the public’s money on, and what success he has had. 
For example, Donald Smaltz, Independent Counsel investigating Mike Espy, has a web 
page."* The page gives a history o f the investigation, the contact address of the counsel’s 
office, as well as providing copies o f  documents, including: the Attomey General’s 
request for appointment o f an Independent Counsel, the Special Division’s order 
appointing the Independent Counsel, the twelve indictments and one civil complaint filed 
to date, the press releases issued by the counsel, the counsel’s three annual reports to 
Congress, and the text o f testimony and speeches delivered by the counsel. This is a great 
way to communicate with people about the counsel’s activities. Each counsel should be 
required to have one.
The Act itself is not likely to be repealed in 1999, nor should it be. Even if 
it was repealed and the Attomey General appointed special prosecutors as she saw fit, we 
would see many o f the same problems. There would still exist pressure regarding 
removal, there would still be substantial resources expended, and the administration 
would still attack the special prosecutor as partisan. In response to questions about The 
Act’s repeal. Senator Henry Hyde recently commented “I can’t predict what is going to
228 http://www.oic.gov/smaltz/index.htm
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happen in the coming year, but my guess would be that we will reauthorize an 
Independent Counsel statute..
The fact is that we do not have the one attribute which would render the 
Independent Counsel statute unnecessary—trust. In Hyde’s words, “[t]he fact is, human 
nature is human nature. I wouldn’t have trusted Ed Meese to prosecute Ronald Reagan 
and 1 don’t trust Janet Reno to prosecute Bill Clinton.”’’" Hyde’s lack of trust is shared 
by many. The deficiencies in The Act can be cured, but the principle behind it cannot. 
We need an independent person to investigate high-level government officials because 
they caimot be trusted to fairly investigate themselves. If that ever changes, then there 
will be no need for a counsel and The Act should be repealed. But change is not 
forthcoming.
For now, the Independent Counsel serves an important function. It stands for the 
proposition that no one is above the law, although in practice it may not always live up to 
that proposition. Changes in The Act may bring a sense of justice to the office which it 
currently lacks. The lessons o f  Watergate have not been forgotten, nor have they been 
proven needless, but they do need to be addressed in a fair, just manner. The Office of 
the Independent Counsel can be a fair, just office if  properly reformed.
Wilkinson and Ellis, 1597. 
Ibid.
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